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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Indian corporate financing originated as a simple
non-competitive system*

It was characterized by person¬

alized methods, wherein the decisions were influenced by
the opinions and judgments of a few individuals.

Regula¬

tion by governmental agencies was inadequate and whatever
changes occurred in the system owed much to the interest
generated by new situations and needs for adoption.
Changes in the government regulation were made because
of the initiative taken in that direction by some pro¬
gressive-minded businessmen and industrialists.
Over the past few decades, however, (particularly
after India achieved independence in 19^7)» there has
been a systematic attempt to modernize its financial
institutions.

The Government of India has assumed a major

role in this modernization.

Advice and assistance from

private businessmen was availed of whenever it was avail¬
able and was not contradictory to the ends.

This develop¬

ment of financial institutions has not been connected with
or patterned after any particular school of thought, but
the basis of present day corporate financing has been to
a large extent British, in conjunction with recent influence
from the U.S.

It would appear that the government is taking
1
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particular interest in this development by fostering struc¬
tural changes so as to bring corporate organization more in
line with British and U. S. pattern,

Thus, the Companies

Act, 1956, attempted reforms in various categories such as
corporate capital structure; company meetings and procedures;
preparation, presentation and auditing of accounts; forma¬
tion of Board of Directors and their powers and duties.

Be¬

sides such measures which could be categorized as reform
through changes and adaptation, other measures have been
adapted to eliminate certain undesirable organizational
patterns.

Thus, it was enacted that the Managing Agents,

that uniquely Indian system, cease operating after a period
of four years.
All these provisions reflect one systematic effort
to change over to new type of organization patterns and
practices.

That such changes were highly essential and

necessary cannot be questioned.

Table 1.1 reflects the

change that came over the Indian industrial scene in one
decade.

Such a development in the present context demands

two prerequisites—capital and managerial skills.

An indus¬

trial organization which fashions its corporate structure
in the manner of western countries requires that managerial
skills be available in quantity as well as quality.

India

has yet to evolve a purely managerial echelon of corporate
industrial executives.

On the topmost level of corporate

industrial executive management the criteria that Influence
the choice are entirely different.

T^mily group or community
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TABLE 1.1
INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS IN INDIA EXPRESSED IN TERMS
OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION

1950-51

1960-61

Items

Unit

Steel Ingot

Mill.Ton

1.4

3.5

150

10.2

Finished
Steel

Mill.Ton

1.0

2.2

120

6.8

Hydrochloric
Acid

000 Ton

267

1500

Cement

Mill.Ton

215

13.0

Caustic
Soda

000 Ton

100

809

340

Diesel
Engines

000 Nos.

4o

627

66

3720

5127

38

5800

101

1050

940

2000

Cotton
Textile

Hi11.Yd'.

Bicycles

000 Nos.

Automobiles

000 Nos.

Installed Power
Generation
Capacity
Mill.Kw

99
2.7
'

11

5.5

363

8.5

% increase

1965-66
Estimated

16.5

53.5

22V

-

2.3

5.7

148

-

Source: 1. "Investing in India"—Indian Investment
Centre, New Delhi, 1961. Pp. 4-5.
2. "Commerce," Bombay.
1961.

Annual Numbers I960,
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affiliations are very strong.

The organizational pattern of

institutions involved in corporate financing appears very
familiar to the western observers; yet the promotion and prac¬
tice reflect the insistence of the Indian businessmen to
operate the seemingly westernized institutions in a typically
Indian manner.

India has all the institutions geared to a

smooth flow of the financial resources of the country in the
direction of industrial enterprises.

Yet in practice these

familiarities give way to inroads fraught with practices
which at best could be described as purely Indian.
Consider, for example, the system of investing in
new securities issue.

The Indian investor will check first

the support the issue is receiving;

what family or group

is backing the issue, what has been the record of that
family, what are the resources that back the group.

On

the basis of that information, the investor would perhaps
decide whether any investment in that issue could be done.
Quite possibly the group floating the issue has among its
various organizations a firm engaged in investments.

In such

cases, the new issue will be subscribed to without much
effort.
Such a procedure is at variance with that followed
in western countries.^

In these countries various risk

factors are an essential feature of an investment policy.
Future financial positions of issuers, future investors*
attitudes, future level and structure of interest rates,
and future purchasing power of the dollar are necessary

5
considerations.

So are the so-called "non-risk factors,”

like taxation, marketability and legality.

An analysis of

present and future business conditions and the selection and
analysis of industries and companies is important.
These considerations have never figured as prominently
in the decisions made by Indian businessmen.

They have re¬

sisted wherever possible any attempts to change the estab¬
lished structure and practices.

The Government of India

has battled continuously this conservative inertia and
resistance.

The Companies Act of 1956 and its subsequent

amendments, the Regulation of Trading in Securities, the
Life Insurance legislation, Control of Capital Issues and
the Regulation of Banking represent the governmental efforts.
Yet these efforts have always been resisted very strongly.
The flood of memoranda resolutions and petitions which the
various Chambers of Commerce and of industries, notably
the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and In¬
dustries (FICCI) sent to the Parliament, various ministries
and government agencies is indicatory of this resistance.
The establishment and operation of a Forum of Free Enter¬
prise is a result of such organized resistance.
Thus it would apoear that there is a contest be¬
tween the progressive element, spearheaded by the govern¬
ment, and the conservative elements made up of Indian
businessmen and industrialists.

Under a typically Indian

system, an industrial enterprise is identified with its own
controlling interests.

This interest may be a person, a

6
family or a group; yet this identification is complete and
the position of the interest is supreme, unique and unassail¬
able.

The position of Sir Biren Mukerjee in Martin Burn

Limited; of Lala Sir Sri Ram in the Delhi Cloth and General
Mills Co. Ltd.; of Mr. Hasturbhai Lalbhai and Mr. Ambalal
Srarbhai in the Textile and Dyes and Chemical industry in
Western India are just a few examples of personal influence.
The position of Birla Brothers, Dalmia-Jains, Singhanias,
Jalans, Goenkas, Mafatlals, and above all Tatas, would be
examples of family oriented influences.

Under such a system

the factors that influence all the decisions (including
financial ones) are the ones that interest these personalities
or family groups.
The powers that such grouos have and the effect of
such a power concentration will have to be measured negatively.
That these groups have participated heavily in the industrial
development of the country, can be seen from the ensuing
discussions.

The focus of attention here is two-fold.

In

the first place, it must be asked whether it is reasonable
to expect a higher rate of growth and development in in¬
dustrial sphere in the light of financial market imperfections
that are discussed in the dissertation.

Secondly, it must

be examined whether the control wielded by these groups
cannot be challenged, and if it can be, what are the pos¬
sibilities.
To provide satisfactory solution to these two points,
it will have to be shown that India possesses a pseudowestern financial structure.

This financial structure
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consists of institutions that are similar to those in
western countries.

These institutions are controlled by

various groups and used to own ends.

This results in de¬

priving such new companies of finances as do not possess
a support of these groups.

In this manner, the group

control thwarts independent industrial growth and develop¬
ment.

To a description and discussion of the nature of

this control the present dissertation will apply itself.
The first part of Chapter Two discusses corporate
structure at the present time.

The Company Law, as it

exists, has attempted to lessen the group influences.
The provisions of law are discussed with a view to deter¬
mine their usefulness and effectiveness.

Part two dis¬

cusses the source of funds as obtained in case of cor¬
porate finances with particular emphasis on the internal
resources that are available to a company.
Chapter Three outlines the organization of Banking
business in India, the way in which the banks satisfy the
financial needs of Indian industries.

The criteria which

influence the role of the bank is explained and contrasted
with the role of banks in other countries.
Chapter Four explains the mode of industrial organ¬
ization that is peculiar to India—the Managing Agency
system.

The nature of this organizational pattern, in¬

fluence and method of operation are discussed.
Chapter Five explains the four facets of an organized
capital market; how far they have developed, how far they
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have adopted the Western system in operation will form the
basis of discussion.
Chapter Six attempts to summarize the information
and the data presented evaluating it in the light of the
problem posed.
The problems which will be discussed here call for
an enormous amount of factual data.

On the spot personal

interviews and evaluations from authoritative sources are
usually necessary but since such appraisals were not pos¬
sible, attempts have been made to tap as many other sources
as possible.

However, the fact that certain data were

unavailable made it necessary to impose certain limitations
on the discussion.
possible.

Recent data has been used wherever

The purely proprietary concerns and partnerships

have been excluded and only the corporate organizations,
private limited and public limited firms, have been con¬
sidered.

Only manufacturing firms have been considered,

thus eliminating automatically such firms that are exclusively
trading and commercial.

In the same way, Government owned

and operated firms are not taken into consideration.

Since

the problem here pertains to finances for industries, any
sector of money and capital market that does not affect
finances for industries has not been considered.

Those

familiar with Indian money market may therefore notice the
absence of any reference to the role played by the Reserve
Bank of India, to the Bill Market and to the Bullion,

The

Bazar Market has been treated as a part of the Indigenous

Banking Sector.

Also excluded from the present discussion

are the cottage industries and the small scale industries.
Attention is focused on the large scale industries with
possible reference to medium scale industries when necessary
Such a circumspection is felt justified, since the organized
corporate sector accounts for over 85# of the industrial
production and over 90# of the capital employed in the
private sector in India.
This study does not claim to analyze the entire
Indian industrial economy or the capital market in general.
It concerns only that portion of industrial economy or
capital market that affects the financial organization of
Indian companies.

For example, absence may be noticeable,

therefore, of any reference to the operation of the Bank
Bate system in India.

Yet it can be justified on the

ground that Indian money market is not rate conscious.
A grant of loan or an advance is not dependent on a high
or low Interest rate.

Rather it is dependent, as the study

will demonstrate, on the group affiliations involved.

CHAPTER TWO
INDIAN COMPANIES:

ORGANIZATION AND INTERNAL FINANCES

This chapter discusses the organizational pattern of Indian
companies. The Indian format is contrasted with the U. S.
pattern.
The subtle difference and the circumstances which
influence the Indian format are discussed.
It is shown why
the Indian format, in spite of its seemingly westernized
nature, remain typically Indian in operation, susceptible to
family-oriented group influences.
The Internal Sources of Finance available to these companies
are discussed. Different types of shares floated by the
Indian companies are introduced.
It is also explained why
the Common stock or the Ordinary share is the most popular
and why the Debenture and Preferred stock have not been made
proper use of.
The ownership of the common stock, leading
to a position which allows inter-corporate investment, is
discussed. How this peculiar share holding allows two
important types of internal financing—reserves and depre¬
ciation—is shown. This holding makes it possible to
restrict dividend and allows a build-up of reserves. At
the same time the ownership-managerial combination allows
the companies to use the depreciation provisions as long
term advances or working capital.
In this fashion the nature of the organization of Indian
companies and their stock distribution allows retention of
family or group oriented control and facilitates financing
to the extent of 35% on the average, purely from internal
finances.
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Structural Organization of Indian Companies;
Indian Joint stock corporate enterprise is organized
fundamentally on the British model.

It can broadly be divided

into two categories—public and private.

A Joint stock com¬

pany is private if by virtue of its articles of association,
it has restricted the rights of its shares, limited the number
of its members to fifty and, above all, prohibited any in¬
vitation to public subscription for shares of the company.
Besides the Joint stock companies, the proprietary and
partnership forms of organization are still prevalent.

How¬

ever, the family oriented businesses and the industrial
houses were quick to realize that the advantages of converting
themselves into a private limited company were too great to
be ignored.

It allowed them to restrict any undesirable

diffusion of ownership and at the same time avail themselves
of the legal identity.

Their private status allowed them

interlocking Directorships (restricted to only 20 per person
in case of Public Limited companies).

It allowed them tax

concessions, lower rates of taxes, considerable leeway where
Director’s remunerations and Expense Accounts are concerned.
Thus all the benefits and advantages were availed of.

The

private limited companies increased their share from 47.3/^
in 1938-39 to 66.5# in 1954-55.
Though the legal position of business changed, its
structure continued without any significant change.

Even

now the corporate organization in India differs from the one
existing in the U.S.

This is evident from the accompanying

12
chart comparing the organizational forms companies in the two
countries assume.

Thus in a typical U. S. company the board

of directors are responsible to the shareholders and are en¬
trusted with making all the major policy decisions.

These

are put into effect by the Chairman and the President of the
Corporation.

The President functions through his Executive

Vice President and other Vice Presidents.

The lines of

authority descend in the order and each officer is responsible
to his immediate superior.

Each officer has a clear-cut idea

of his proper function, his position in the organization and
his duties as well as rights.
As against this the Indian companies are singularly
lacking in such a clarity.

For example, Chart 2a traces the

organizational pattern of a company that is not managed by
the managing agents.

The Board of Directors derives its

powers from the shareholders but this is delegated to the
Managing Director or the Director-in-Charge.

He is assisted

by a General Manager under whom are different departmental
chiefs.

Technically speaking the departmental chiefs are

responsible to the General Manager.
A similar situation is obtained where the board of
directors has delegated all the authority in favor of the
managing agents.

The managing agents discharge their duties

through the General Manager.

On the surface of it, both these

organizational forms look similar to that obtained in the U.S.
Yet the way this pattern comes to be operated is very dis¬
similar.

1.

Corporate
Board of Directors
Chairman and Chief Executive
>!/
President

4/

Executive Vice President
r~
v.p,
.

—f—

v.p,

—?

v.p,

v.p,

“1

7
v.p.

v.p.

Corporate Organization of, a,, Typical, Indian Firm
Not .jfenagod by Mnsftftlpfe /*■<«&».
Board of Directors

(2.a)

Accountant

Production Mgr

Sales Mgr.

Corporate Organization of a Typical Indian.Flrn
Managed by Kanaglm
-nK, Adopts
Board of Directors
(2.b)

i

l

General Manager

Prod. Mgr.

Managing Agent

Acct.

denotes direct authority
denotes indirect authority

etary

Sales Mgr.
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In India the two functions of ownership and management
are not separated or clearly demarcated.

The chief executive

of a typical company, as was seen in chart 2a, is the managing
Director, or as in some recent cases, the Director-in-Charge.
This position would correspond to that of a President and Chief
Executive in a U.S. Corporation.

The Managing Director is a

prominent member of the Board of Directors.

He is the repre¬

sentative of the group that holds the controlling interest,
unless, as in some exceptional cases, he has been brought in
because of his skills.

Besides the Managing Director, no other

company executive is likely to be a member of the Board.

Thus,

the Managing Director is the only communicating link between
the Board and the officers of the company.

There is no system

of stock options for top executives in India, hence the com¬
pany officials are not likely to hold any shares, except in
their individual personal capacity.

Such a system is at once

the cause and the effect of the fact that the owner is closely
identified with the manager.

The Managing Director emerges

then as the single center of authority in the entire organ¬
ization on the one hand.

On the other, the fact that he repre¬

sents the majority interest makes the theoretical lines of
authority and responsibility, which a board is supposed to
have, redundant.

Theoretically a board is responsible to

the shareholders, but this allegiance is nullified because
the Managing Director represents the majority interest.

Sim¬

ilarly, the officers of the company are supposed to be respon¬
sible to the Board, but in practice become responsible to the
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Managing Director, since the board will have invariably re¬
signed the exercise of powers in favor of the Managing Director.
Thus, one may repeat, the Managing Director, emerges as the
single center of effective authority.
from association.

His position is derived

His power is undeniable, able as he is,

to fuse the dual functions of ownership and management.
Similar fusion is seen in case of companies where
managing agents are functioning.

The authority of the board

of directors exists only in name because the managing agents
control the majority shareholding, and therefore are in a
position to nominate the members of the board.
The resulting managerial ownership organization leads
to interesting changes in the concept of the function and
powers of the board.

Legally speaking, the board, as the

representative of the shareholders, is the center of all the
power and authority relevant to the administration of the
company.

However, because of the reasons explained above,

the members of the Board are either completely deprived of
their power (if the company is managed by the managing agents),
or come to play a secondary role to those members of the board
that represent the dominant interest.

Advantages of such a

position are assumed in nomination to the Board such persons
as would be prominent in the particular field of the company,
or that are likely to be of assistance to the company on account
of their prominence in different fields such as Banking, Finance
and so forth.

These people are not likely to interfere in the

actual working of the company.

The effect of such situations
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may be found in the emergence of multiple or interlocking
directorships.
The system of interlocking directorships is used by
Indian businessmen to maintain control over divergent companies.
An analysis of the distribution of directorships
reveals that a large number of directorships are held
by a minority of influential persons.
In the Coal
Industry, out of % companies, 51 companies with 247
directorships are controlled by 28 persons, 7 of whom
hold 64 directorships.
In Jute, 267 directorships are
held by 130 persons, 4 of whom have 82 directorships.
In the joint stock companies surveyed by Mr. Ashok
Mehta* there were 3*728 directorships distributed among
1,103 persons 1 61 of whom held 1,039 directorships,
while 20 of them held 805 directorships.^
The Government of India tried to discourage such a concentra¬
tion by making it unlawful for one individual to become a
director in more than 20 companies.

In effect this would

release more openings for more directorships than exist at
present.

However, in practice this provision is thwarted by

the simple relationship based on Group philosophy.

For

example, a directorship in a firm like Tata Sons would count
for one directorship.

However, in reality this would be as

effective as a directorship in a dozen or more concerns since
Tata Sons control and manage a dozen industrial enterprises.
Similarly a directorship in Birla Brothers should qualify for
more than one directorship since Birla Brothers Limited manage
and/or control other industrial companies.

A similar influence

could be exercised by a director with Mafatlal Gagalbhai or
Soorajmull Nagarmull or Sahu Jain or Juggilal Kamlapat - to
cite a few examples where filial relationships are closer and
more intimate accounting for greater influence.

Such an
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All such provisions were designed to affect the organ¬
ization and working of enterprises in different fields—in¬
cluding the financial sphere.

Yet how far can these provisions

be considered successful?
Table 11,1 indicates the Sources of Funds position for
Indian companies—private limited as well as public limited.
For any enterprise the most important capital is one that forms
its Shares and Debenture stock.

Such capital can be raised by

issuing appropriate securities.

In India Preferred and Ordinary

are the two types of shares which a company issues.
issue has had a limited usage.

Preference,

One possible explanation is

that it carries a fixed return and restricts thereby a par¬
ticipation in rising earnings of the company.
in Preferred stock loses on both counts.

Thus an investor

In India Preferred

stock carries a fixed rate of return which is not connected
with the actual earnings of the company.

Therefore he does

not participate in the higher earnings of the company.

Nor

does he have the precedence, as with a Debenture holder, over
the distribution of corporate assets.

Table II.2 lists the

consents granted by the Controller of Capital Issues during
the years 1957-61.

The maximum percentage raised through issue

of Preference shares is 6.5 in 1957; lowest 2.2 in 1953.
the same table are given figures for Debenture issue.

In

Absence

of a strong debenture market has resulted in putting extra
strain on other financial resources of Indian companies.

In

the light of the heavy contributions made by investing public
to loans floated by Governments, Central, State as well as

18

TABLE II.1
CORPORATE SECTOR:

SOURCES OF FUNDS

Public limited companies
191+6-51 1951-55 1956-58

Source

Frivate, limited cos.
194-6-4-9
1956-57

INTERNAL
Depreciation
Reserves-*-

31.75
20.60
11.15

59.68
26.98
32.71

36.40
20.08
16.32

26.46
12.14
14.32

33.68
19.44
17.24

EXTERNAL
Capital^
Borrowings
Bank Borrowing

50.40
23.95
26.45
13.75

30.62
6.52
24.09
9.49

63.02
10.62
52.39
18.47

27.67
6.33
21.44
12.03

neg.

neg.

neg.

52.43
28.16
24.27
24.03
12.14

17.81

9.70

0.59

9*22

1.78

Trade Dues
Miscellaneous

33.87

■^Excludes capitalized reserves.
2Includes capitalized reserves.
Source:

Compiled from:
Government of India, MReport of the Taxation
Enquiry Commission,” Vol. I, New Delhi, 1954-55.
Reserve Bank of India, Monthly Bulletins for
the months of Sept. 1957, Sept. I960. Bombay.
**********

TABLE II.2
CAPITAL ISSUES CONSENTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

YEAR

Rs.

1957
1958

PREFERRED

ORDINARY

145.8
1959
i960
211.5
1961
June
144.3
AVERAGE
Source:

57
88

9.9
9.5
72 11.4
73 8.4

TOTAL

LOANS

Rs,

%

Rs.

%

6
2

9.1
18.5

6
4

47.1
21.2

6

9.9
19.6

5

36.4

31
5
18

7

50.1

17

nr" Rs.

87.2
373.8

D3BENTURKS

3

Rs.

V

153.3
423.0

100
100

203.5
289.6

100
100

5 23.0 15 148.3 100
17
5
Daily Financial Express of January 25? 1962
Data compiled by Mr. P. C. Jain.

77
74

4.2

3
4

6.8
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local, the unpopularity of corporate debentures requires some
justification.

The Indian investor has always looked for a

fair amount of security in his investments.

When it is a

choice between two investments, both offering equal return,
he is likely to choose one that offers maximum security—the
Government loans.

Secondly the average investor has for long

been suspicious about the activities carried on by the cor¬
porate sector and its ability to honor its pledges.

It is

interesting to note that the Tata Iron and Steel Company
Limited, an Indian company that has relied on debentures for
its long-term capital needs and has always made a success of
its debenture issue, is a company of unquestioned integrity
and unrivalled prestige in the country.

The same cannot be

said about other Indian companies which tried to float de¬
benture issue.

Thirdly, it was customary for a debenture

issue to be taken up by private interests? the landlords, the
Princes and the general wealthy classes.

In the independent

India the emphasis was on a socialistic pattern of society.
In accordance with this objective legislation was passed to
abolish land estates.

Similar legislation was passed increasing

the level of taxation on wealthy classes.

All the socialistic

legislation had one singular effect in reducing the investing
power of these classes.

Since It became increasingly difficult

to secure their support, any new issue of debentures became
increasingly difficult.

Finally, for reasons not sufficiently

clear, the Indian money market—especially the banks—have been
very reluctant in the past to have any commitments with such
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firms as have floated debentures,

Indian companies depend on

banks for a large percentage of their loans.

Yet

according to the Central Banking Enquiry Committee,
Indian companies which had issued debentures found it
difficult to secure bank loans and cash credit on the
usual terms.
Perhaps some banks thought it was not
safe to lend money to an undertaking which had already
had such heavy debt charges.^
Another type of share that is issued sometimes in
India is the Bonus share.

Rising out of the capitalization

of undistributed profits, this had been a very popular method
with the Indian industries immediately after the second World
War.

During the quinquennium of 19^7, 60$ of the reserves and

funds were capitalized.

Table II.3 gives the industrywise

distribution of bonus shares.

However,

it is interesting to note that the issue of Bonus
share by capitalization of reserves was a temporary
phenomenon in India and disappeared with the exhaustion
of accumulated profits within seven years after the
second world war.^
Two notes could be appended here.
Bonus payments have to be made to avoid taxes or to
obey legal compulsion. The Indian Income Tax act under
Section 23*+ presumes 60$ of earned profits as distri¬
buted for tax purposes.
In the event of default, (that
is to say, if dividends are not distributed) tax
authorities assume entire profits as distributed and
levy taxes accordingly.^
An Indian company has to assume an enormous burden in such a
case.

It pays Income tax @ 30$ plus a Surcharge @ 5$.

It

pays a ration tax @ 20% and Wealth tax, which is related to
Capital, @ £$ for companies that have capital assets exceed¬
ing Rs. 500,000.

In case a dividend is paid out the company

pays a dividend tax @10, 20 or 30$ on dividends exceeding
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TABLE IT.3
PERCENTAGE CONTRIBUTI ON OF BONUS SHARES IN
PAID UP CAPITAL OF SIX MAJOR INDUSTRIES AT
THE END OF THE YEAR 1953-5^

Industry

Total
Paid Up
Capital

1

2

Cotton
Textiles
Jute
Textiles
Sugar
Coal
Cement
Iron and
Steel
Total

Total
Raised

Total
raised
by Bonus
shares

k

3

2 as
$ of
1

3 as
%

of
1

51

&

5073

3222

1851

63

37

2601
1515
977
2236

2012
1260
352
2075

539
255

23
17
13

211

77
33
87
90

10

2522

1836

686

73

27

14974

112 57

3717

75

25

125

Amounts are in Rs. hundred thousands.
Source:
S. S. Srinivasan, "Auto- financing” in Indian
Journal of Economics, ?Iev Delhi.
Pp. 187 •
************

TABLE n.4
BOOTS SHARES IN THE INDIAN CAPITAL MARKET

Year

i

Total
Consent
2

Consent
for Bonus
shares
3

Total
raised
if

1958

39.45

9.88

103.74

1959

149.53

2.88

I960

150.13

0.77

83.69
84.22

Bonus
issue
raised
5

11.47
4.32
0.50

Amounts are In Rs. ten million.
Source:

RBI Bulletin, Bombay, 1960-61.

5 as

%

Of

b

6
1.7

4.5
o.5
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6, 10 or 18# respectively on the face value of it.

(30 ♦ 5 4

corporation would pay taxes to the tune of
20 41),

Thus a

As against this the tax on Bonus shares issued out

of Reserves is calculated at a flat rate of 30#.
There is a second inducement to issue of Bonus shares.
The Bonus capital did not take the form of an addition
of shares but in most cases the nominal value of partly
paid share capital already issued was written down which
reduced gap between nominal and paid up value of shares.
(Ennhasis added.
However, in spite of such attractions the actual issue of Bonus
shares has not shown much promise.
Table II.4.

Thi3 is reflected in

It Is seen therein that bonus issue has been

negligible as a percentage of total issue floated and sub¬
scribed.

This would have to be attributed to reluctance of

the Government to let business get away without paying the
higher percentage to taxes.

Since no issue can be without a

governmental sanction, the bonus shares have formed such a
low percentage.

The common stock thus emerges as the largest

single type floated, averaging 87.5# of the total 3tock floated
as is seen in Table II.2.
Whatever the predominant type of share on the market,
it is by and large the ownership of shares that determines
the complexion of a corporate enterprise.

Table II.5 gives the

ownership breakdown of investment in shares.

It can be seen

that, numerically individuals rank highest.

A differentiation

Is made between salary earning individuals and non-salary
earners.

The former comprises the class on which the joint

stock companies in western countries rely for stock investment.

TABLE II.5
INVESTMENT IN SHARES*

CATEGORY OF
INVESTORS
INDIVIDUALS
Salary Earners
Non-salary
earners

1958-59

NUMBER OF SHAREHOLDERS
NUMBER
%

DIVIDEND INCOME
RUPEES
%

125,099
32,302

89
23

39.72
11.15

53
15

92,797

66

28.57

38

10,595

7

4.51

6

UNREGISTERED FIRMS
AND OTHER ASSCNS.

2,726

2

3.22

REGISTERED FIRMS .

657

1

0.9“+

1

COMPANIES .

2,112

2

26.61>

35

HINDU UNDIVIDED
FAMILY ....

Divided Income in Rs. ten million.
Source:
"Eastern Economist"—"Special Budget Number"
New Delhi, March 6, 1961. Pp. 697.
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The other class Includes the wealthier sections of the com¬
munity.

Though in absolute numbers, these sections might

aopear as constituting a majority, the dividend figures reveal
a different story.

Since dividend earnings are dependent on

the amount of stock held it appears that the corporate sector
holds the largest number of stock in value.

Their combined

earnings constitute a proportion of 4l$ of the total dividends
distributed.

In India there is an absence of any organized

Institutional contribution to corporate stock holding.

This

means that the corporate holding evident in Table II.5 repre¬
sents the inter-corporate investment prompted by a grouporiented investment policy.

Such a holding has made it

possible for companies to refrain from any undesired dividend
distribution and build up reserves.

Table II.6 indicates that

the percentage of retained earnings to dividends distributed
is 150%, while Table II.7 shows how companies in different
industries have maintained high profit retention ratios.
Besides the reserves created out of retained profits,
depreciation contributes heavily as an internal source of
funds, forming almost 55$ of the internal sources.

Table II.8

compares depreciation provisions allowed in different countries.
It can be said, on the basis of this comparison, that the pro¬
visions for Indian Industries are quite favorable.

In Table

II.1, it was seen that depreciation forms 20$ of the total
funds available to the public limited firms and 19.*+*+$ of the
total funds available to the private limited firms.

The

liberal provisions for depreciation are attributable on the
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TABLE II.6
DISTRIBUTION OF EARNINGS OF COMPANIES
1958
1.

Total Earnings ..•••••.. 575

2.

Depreciation Provision .

3.

Tax Provision

4.

Net Earnings 1 - (2 4 3) ... . 26?

5.

Dividend distributed . 163

6.

Earnings retained

. . .

. 129

181

.

Amounts are
in Rs.
ten million

. . 102

Percentage of retained profits to
net profits
.*39
Percentage of retained profits to dividends
distributed
(2.4.6. : 5).150
Source: H. T. Parekh, "Future of Joint Stock
Companies in India", Jaico, Bombay, 1958, Pp. 4l

TABLE II.7
NET PROFIT & PROFIT RETENTION RATES FOR
PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANIES

>51-55
Vi
Profit; Retained

Industry

Cotton Textile

Net
as a % of
Net worth

Profits
as a %
of net
nrofit

1955-58
Net profit
Retained
as a % of
Profits
Net worth
as a %
of net
profit
- 7.8

65.5

*+.3
14.9

6.4

53.0

9.9

44.7

Cement

11.0

39.3

8.8

27.3

Sugar

10.0

41.3

9.1

32.5

Iron & Steel
Engineering

5.6

23.5

17.6

70.7

Source: Compiled from RBI Monthly Bulletin for
Sept. 60. Bombay.
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TABL2 II.8
Comparative Statement shoving rate* of Depreciation allowed by the fiscal
Authorities in India and other Foreign Countries

India
U.S.
U.K. Australia
Canada
(A)
(3)
(C)
(D)
(X)
Current rates on
_W. D. V.__
I Bullding: (1) First Class substantial
buildings of selected
materials.2.5$
1.5$
••
1$
5$
(ii) Buildings of less
substantial construction 5$
to
2$
(ill) Third class buildings
of less substantial
20$
construction.7*5$
3$
••
3?
(iv) Purely temporary wooden structure • renewals may be written off
II Machinery Plant A Furniture:20$
General rate.7$
20 years useful
2.5$ to
(st. line) 10$
5$
Jute.9$
7i$ to
10$
Special rates for Sugar works
(Pollers in Sugar Works)
9$
28 to 50 years
7.5$
(Heplacement)
Chemical Works ...... .10$
15 to 22 years 5$
7«5$
20$
to 15$
Cement Works using rotary
kilns.10$
20 to 25 years ..
7*5$
III Motor Cars:-.20$
2 to 5 years ...
25$
IV Electrical Machinery:(I) Batteries ....... 20$
..
••
••
••
(ii) Other Electrical machinery
including generator switch
gear and instruments, trans¬
formers etc.10$
17 to 20 years ..
5$
6$
Double these rates (or special rates) may be allowed for buildings used tn
industries which cause special deterioration such as chemical works,
soap and candle works, paper mills etc.etc.
Botes

(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)
(X)

Pule 8 of Income Tax Pules under Income Tax Act
Unofficially from C. B. R. records
Tolley* 1 II III IVs Income Tax Manual 1955-56
"Schedule of rates of Depreciation" issued by Commissioner of Income
Tax -18-1-1951.
"Taxation in Canada * by Bank of Montreal

Source: HCA2R: "Replacement Costs in Industries", Ministry of Labour
A Employment Book of India, Hew Delhi, I960, P. 69

one hand to an absence of a clearly defined depreciation
policy.

The National Council of Applied Economic Research in

New Delhi, which prepared a study of the replacement costs in
Indian industries, found that depreciation practices are
followed for reasons quite divergent.
The depreciation formula followed by most of the
companies is a fixed percentage of the written down
value of an asset .... (However) our companies do
not make any allowance for rising prices of machinery
while estimating depreciation .... The replacement
funds of our companies are often mixed up with the
general reserve. Expenditures on expansion and modern¬
ization are mixed up with those on replacement proper
.... Rates of depreciation charged by companies
vary from 2-J-# to 10# in case of factory buildings and
from 3# to 15# in case of plant and machinery. Such
divergent rates on the same kind of asset in the same
industry suggest that decisions of management con¬
cerning depreciation allowance are influenced by con¬
siderations which are not always purely economic
.... The relation (between allowance for depre¬
ciation and actual expenditure) is further obscured
by the fact that replacement funds are used within
business as working capital, so that replacement,
when due, has to be financed by loans or new issue.g
Depreciation and reserves thus form a source of funds
for Indian companies, which in case of public limited com¬
panies accounts for 36.4# of total funds and in case of
private limited companies accounts for 33.68# to total
funds.

Inasmuch as depreciation and reserves are charges on

the earnings of the companies ploughed back profits thus
emerge as a major source of funds.
Proportion of (such) financing amounted to 78# in
raining industry. 49 Chemical firms reported it at
62#. Roughly 3/4 of the resources invested at long
term in 1142 companies were earned within the com¬
panies themselves.
The ratio of self-financing in
case of net investment in fixed assets was over 45#.^
A comparison of these rates with those obtained in

foreign countries will not show much imbalance.
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The difference,

however, lies in the circumstances that make such provisions
possible in India.

The high percentage of reserves is not the

result of any premeditated policy adhered to by corporate
owners or managers.

As shown in the discussions in Chapters

III and V, other sources of finance are not available to Indian
entrepreneurs.

They have perforce to fall back on their own

internal resources.

That they are in a position to do so, is

the result of a lopsided ownership position, which lets the
company cut dividends and accumulate it as reserve.
dividends have been declared, as much as

Even where

of this distributed

dividend is returned to the interests that control the corpora¬
tion (as seen in Table II.5).

If such stock-holding did not

exist, it would have been impossible for the company to re¬
frain from distributing a large portion of the existing earn¬
ings, thus depleting contributions to the reserves.
It should be therefore easy to understand how the high
percentage of internal financing is possible for two reasons.
First, a restriction of dividend is necessary to build up re¬
serves.

Second, a group-oriented investment permits such

restriction.

Considered in the absence of any other source of

funds, the position of the reserves indicates its own
importance.

CHAPTER THREE
THE BANKING COMPANIES IN INDIA AND
THEIR PARTICIPATION IN INDUSTRIAL
FINANCING
This chapter discusses the banking sector
financing. Data is presented to show how
not contribute to industrial financing of
nature. Their contribution is restricted
financing.

of industrial
the banks do
any long term
to short term

It is shown how the banks do not take up any shares nor
do they make any long term advances.
The nature of their
advances is such that their assistance is not necessarily
available to growth industries.
The advances made by them
are made on hypothecation of goods that make it obvious
that the requirements are nominal.
The real criteria by
which the banking operation is guided, is the age-old
group principle.
This has resulted in two developments.
Groups have
tended to have their own banking arrangements with a
particular bank.
Secondly, industries have had to look
to other sources for finances.
That the banks do not participate in industrial finan¬
cing in other countries also, has been shown. A model
is also cited how the Indian banks could follow the
trail blazed by the German banks.
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Indigenous Bankers In India;
If the term "Banking activity” is understood to mean
the accepting of deposits, granting of loans at interest and
discounting of trade bills, the origins of banking activity.

This, however, is characterized by the essentially personalized
tendencies in the operation.

The so-called Houses which were

engaged in this activity, depended upon the reputation of one
person, usually the head of the family.

The lending and dis¬

counting of commercial bills constituted the major portion of
the business transacted by these houses.

The funds for such

an activity were derived from the profits of the commercial
transactions of these houses.

The fortunes of the banking

activity were closely connected and directly affected by the
commercial activity of these houses.
Today this activity has continued unhindered, but
tends to be identified with communities rather than indivi¬
duals.

Thus, a reference may be found in the various Bank

Enquiry Commissions reports, to the so-called "Indigenous
Bankers", which are characterized by specific communities
of SHROFFS, MARWARI or MTTLTANI communities in the Northern,
Western, Eastern and Central India and of CH5TTIARS in South
India.
Different communities of Indigenous bankers are to be
found in every part of the country.
The type ranges from the small village capitalist to
the wealthy, well established, private partnership,
generally a family partnership, of merchant bankers.
... A special type is that of the Chetty community in
Madras, where there exists something approaching to
joint responsibility to the community as a whole.^
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Indigenous banking is not organised on a joint stock basis.
There is no share capital and liability is unlimited.

An

Indigenous banker allows his activities to extend to financing
of agriculturists, local trade and arts*

He may engage in trade

himself and also may participate in the distribution of goods.
He discounts hundies and lends money against gold,
godds or personal security. He also buys bills on
Government treasuries and when in need discounts them
with the commercial banks in town. He pays higher
rate of interest than the banks on any deposits he
may receive^
The chief instrument of business financing by these bankers is
the HUNDI.

A ITTNDI is a negotiable instrument, coming very

close to its sophisticated counterpart, the Bill of Exchange.
A HUNDI transaction can take many forms.

It could be a

DARSHANI HUNDI, (a bill of usance payable on its presentation)
or it can be a MUDDATI HUNDI (payable after a certain period
of time).

This period may vary from 11 to 361 days.

There is

a customary provision of three to five days of grace in case
the maturity period is more than eleven days,

A HUNDI can

also be a PHANIJOG, payable to the payee only, or SHAHJOG.
payable to any respectable banker or merchant house.

In the

latter case, the burden of responsibility of checking into
the credit standing and the authenticity-status of the payer
and the payee falls on the banker cashing such a HUNDI.

A

HUNDI may also have the features of a bank check—it can be
DEKHANDHAR. payable to bearer, or it can be FTKHANJOG, payable
to order.

A HUNDI can be a purely financial bill, drawn by

one party in need of cash; or it can be a trade bill drawn
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against produce or goods.

The negotiable nature of the

HUNDI makes it possible to discount and rediscount it until
maturity is attained.
It is not difficult to see that the indigenous banker
has special position in the Indian money market.

Table III.l

cites the percentage-wise contribution of different agencies
to the agricultural sector of the economy.

The fact that may

need explanation is that between themselves the agricultural
TABLE III.l
CONTRIBUTION OF DIFFERENT AGENCIES TO
AGRICULTURAL CREDIT
Credit Agency

Proportion of total
borrowing

ORGANIZED SECTOR
.

3.3

Cooperatives .
Commercial Banks ..

3.1
0.9

Government.

INDIGENOUS SECTOR
Relatives

.•••••••••..

14.2

Landlord

.
Agricultural money lender* • • • •

1.5
24.9

Professional money lender. ....
Traders and Commission Agents. • •

44.8
5*5

nthpi'Q

i

ft

SourceT ""RESERVE' 'MTWTWt'k MLetTTT ~
beeember 195^, Bombay.
money lender and the professional money lender contribute
69.7# of the total rural credit.

It would also be desirable

to divide the category “Relatives”, since among the "Relatives”
there would be people who would qualify as professional money
lenders.

Therefore, somewhere near three-fourths of the

total rural credit is obtained from the Indigenous bankers,
comprising chiefly of Agricultural money lender and

Professional money lenders; while the Organized sector, com¬
prising of Government, Cooperatives and commercial banks,
contributed only one-fourth.
The Indigenous Bankers* advances to the industrial
and commercial sectors are no less conspicuous, however,
these are restrictive in scope.

Because of the essential

nature of their banking transactions, their business is
restricted to a particular class.

Industries that are under¬

capitalized and have no other regular source of capital avail
able to them have had to resort to this type of financing.
For these companies, the conventional methods of either
deposit financing (because of absence of reputation) or
of internal resources (because of absence of financial
strength) are not available.

Another class of companies

depending on these bankers is the one which is not as yet
acclimated to the systematized procedures of a joint stock
bank.

The indigenous banker relies on his personal knowledge

acumen and judgment, often requiring of his client nothing
more than a personal bond.

If satisfied with his client’s

integrity he could even waive the necessity of a security or
hypothecation of property.
The price of this personal procedure unhindered by
any of the organized markets* drawbacks is the high rate of
interest which the debtor has to pay.

Under natural circum¬

stances, backed by good security, this rate would vary be¬
tween 7 to 9 per cent.

However, it is quite possible to

come across a transaction which involves payment of interest
at 75 to 125 per cent—such a transaction would involve grave

3*+
risks under which the loan has been advanced.

The Indian

Central Banking Enquiry Committee revealed that Coal com¬
panies paid a rate between 12 and 18 per cent while the new
industries like Paper, Sugar, Tanneries etc., paid a rate be¬
tween 15 to 20 per cent.

The risk in these cases resulted

from the fact that these were all new industries and required
venture capital.
Modernization of Indigenous Bankers:
Attempts have been made on more than one occasion to
bring this unorganized sector into the fold of the organized
money market.

Indigenous Bankers* insistence on relying on

their own resources and their reluctance to maintain deposits
or balances with either the joint stock banks or the State
Bank of India makes it difficult for the latter to put them
on approved lists.

It Is quite customary for an indigenous

banker to ask for and receive accommodation from joint stock
banks, but this will be most likely restricted to discounting
of HUNDIS drawn by the Indigenous banker.

There is an under¬

standable preference in such transactions for HUNDIS that are
trade HUNDIS backed by a bona-fide sale of commodities over
purely financial HUNDIS.
Efforts on part of the Government toward integration
include emphasis on streamlining the working of the indigenous
bankers.

Many recommendations have been made by the Reserve

Bank of India.

The way the indigenous bankers mixed banking

and non-banking activities has always lent a certain instability
to their operations.

As explained earlier, the ups and downs

of the non-banking activities, trade agriculture, etc., affected
their banking activity directly.

To neutralize their banking

activity from these effects, the Indigenous bankers were asked
to confine their activities to banking only; at the cost of
their other activities.

Further, they were asked to maintain

a minimum statutory working balance of Rs. 200,000.00 (this
minimum to be increased to five hundred thousand later).

More

important from the point of view of the Reserve Bank of India
were their recommendations whereby (1) the indigenous bankers
would have had to reveal the names of the partners and other
parties with whom they deal, (2) a complete regularization of
the method of keeping accounts and books of account and exam¬
ination and auditing of these books by a recognized auditor.
The indigenous bankers havo shown their unwillingness to any
change that will co3t them their individuality and business
secrecy.

As a result the unorganized sector of the Indian

money market has maintained its own identity in the money
market and not merged with or linked in any way with the other
organized sectors.
The need for some sort of a liaison between the or¬
ganized and unorganized sectors Is filled by the various
types of brokers, who specialize in this type of work.

These

brokers may combine more than one nature of brokeraget
foreign exchange, deposit, loan and share; or they may
restrict themselves only to deposit brokerage.

"Deposit

brokerage” is a service which the brokers perform on behalf
of a bank in attracting deposits at the bank from different
sources—Individual or corporate.

In other words, the broker
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may act as a scout for the bank.

His personal integrity and

position indirectly gives reassurance of the position of the
bank he is representing.

A broker would facilitate inter¬

bank lending and have the surplus cash from business houses
and/or individuals of consequence placed with the bank.

They

may be instrumental in getting the joint and several loans
renewed or the HTTIfDIS of indigenous bankers rediscounted.
The latter transaction involves a four parties transaction:
the merchant who originates the HUNDI. discounted by the
indigenous banker in the first instance is handed over to
the broker who gets it re-discounted at a bank on his personal
guarantee.

The advice and information of these brokers may

be sought with regard to the credit worthiness of a party.
JOINT STOCK BANKING Iff IffPIA;
The development of joint stock banicing in India dates
to the last century when the three Presidency banks of Bengal,
Bombay and Madras were started.

The Imperial Bank of India

(IBI) formed in 1921 by an amalgamation of these three banks,
served as the central bank of India till 1935 at which time
a special act brought into existence India’s central bank,
the Reserve Bank of India (RBI).

The Imperial Bank returned

to purely commercial activities and till 1955 was next to the
Reserve Bank in influencing the money market in India.

However,

in that year the Imperial Bank was nationalized and turned
into the State Bank of India (SBI).
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Role of Imperial Bank and State Bank In Industrial Financing:
Till its nationalization, the investment policy of the
Imperial Bank was influenced by, but not subjected to, govern¬
mental directives.

It was however, strictly Gilt-edge-oriented,

Thus, while the Deposit to Investment ratio never varied beyond
45# to 55$, the investment in government securities con¬
stituted the major portion.

As is evident from Table III,2,

the investments, or rather, the amounts available for invest¬
ing in the industries are almost negligible in 1947 and
relatively less in later years.

It can be said that the

TABLE III.2
INVESTMENTS OF THE IMPERIAL .BANK OF INDIA
IN GOVERNMENTAL SECURITIES:
19*+7-54

YEAR

1947

19^9

1951

1952

1953

1954

INVESTMENT*

94.71

90.47

80.94

82.90

85.98

87.33

’►The figures for Investment refer to the ratio of
government securities as a percentage of the total investment.

Imperial Bank did not have any long-term investments and to
that extent the long-term investment portfolios were deprived
of the support and attention they deserved.
One more way the Imperial Bank could influence indus¬
trial finance was by increasing or decreasing the bank rate
and the HUNDI discount rate.

Coupled with the loans and
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advance policy of the bank, this could have worked effectively,
influencing the availability of credit and working capital.
However, the peculiar relationship the Imperial Bank had had
with the Government of India may have been an obstacle to
accomplish this.

Since any change in the rate or in the loan

policy tended to have an effect on the entire banking world
as well as the economy as a whole, it was natural that a
very conservative policy should be adopted by the Imperial
Bank.
After nationalization, in addition to being the
successor to the Imperial Bank, the State Bank became a signal
force in the Indian money market on its own merits.

It is

the largest single commercial bank with deposits, in 1961,
amounting to about one-third of the other bank deposits
in the country (see Table III.3).

It operates with the

largest number of branches carrying on diversified and varied
business, serving industry trade and agriculture.

The State

Bank was established as a
strong integrated state-partnered commercial banking
institution with an effective machinery of branches
spread over the whole country for stimulating banking
development for providing vastly extended remittance
facilities for cooperative and other banks, following
a policy which would be in effective consonance with
national policies adopted by the Government without
departing from the cannons of sound business.-^
There is, therefore, an understandable restriction on the bank
not to let the number of private shareholders increase beyond
45$.

Its board of directors is appointed in part directly by

the Government of India and in part with consultation with
other Governmental agencies, with the exception of six directors
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which are elected to represent the private interests.

Essen¬

tially a government operated institution, the State Bank depends
heavily on the business generated by directives issued and
policies adopted by the government.

The State Bank acts as the

Government representative in managing currency chests and
handling receipts and payment on government authorities'
accounts, quasi public funds arising out of funds for minors,
liquidators, local government authorities and court deposits.
Business is indirectly generated by the provisions under
Section 2b

of the Banking Companies Act which prescribes the

minimum assets to be maintained by the banking companies.
This section permits the balances of the banking companies
with the State Bank to be treated as cash.
With the nationalization of the State Bank the whole
outlook towards investments, short as well as long term,
changed.

The chief task of the newly nationalized State Bank

was two-fold:

(1) increasing bank consciousness among the

people by opening new branches; (2) development of rural and
agricultural credit in the country.

The policy of the Govern¬

ment of India, was overwhelmingly oriented in favor of the
establishment and progress of cooperative institutions and
of assisting the growth of small-scale industries.

This re¬

sulted in some amount of negligence concerning the needs of
the organized large firms in industries.
COMMERCIAL BAKKS AND LONG TERM INVESTMENT FINANCING:
The Indian commercial banks have two major classifica¬
tions:

Scheduled and Unscheduled.

A bank having an aggregate

41
value of paid up capital and reserves of Rs. 500,000.00 or
more and depositing at least five percent of their demand and
two percent of their time liabilities with the Reserve Bank
are listed as such in the Second Schedule of the Reserve Bank
of India Act and derive the classification therefrom of being
a Scheduled bank.

An unscheduled bank by contrast does not

conform to these requirements.
That the banks as a principal financial intermediary
should play a very significant role in the industrialization
of the country by mobilizing funds from the community and
channeling them towards productive investment, needs no
repetition.

Nor does the fact that Indian banks play an in¬

significant role.
Table III.3 gives a very good indication of this.
The total owned funds to deposits ratio is at 1:4.

Their

cash reserves are higher than the sum of the bills purchased
and bills discounted.

Out of a total of over sixteen billion

rupees of available working capital, their investments amounted
to a little over five billion rupees, while their loans and
advances amounted to eight billion rupees, the latter forming
$ of the total credit advanced.
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Since this shows clearly

where the bias of banking companies rests it may be expedient
to analyze further their investment portfolios.
Table III.4 shows the progress of the investment pattern
through the years 195C-1956.

One striking point to be noticed

is the rigidity of figures in important categories.

It should

be remembered that it was this period that covered the operation

TABLE III.4
ANALYSIS OF THE INVESTMENT PATTERN OF
SCHEDULED BANKS

Type of
Investment

1950

1954

1955

1956

Govt. Securities

366.0

357.5

396.1

377.7

Trust Securities

7*1

10.8

13.8

15.5

Fixed deposits

0.4

3.5

3A

3.3

14.4

11.2

11.8

11.2

5.8

6.5

6.8

6.8

—

0.02

0.02

0.02

0.6

0.35

0.39

0.14

Shares and deben.
of Jt.St.Cos.
Real Estate
Bullion
Others

Foreign Investment 21.7

23.8

21.2

Amounts are in Rs. ten
millions
Source*
S. R. K. Rao, The Indian Money Market.
Charibanga Publishing House, Allahabad, i95>9j P. 21.

26.4

of India*s first Five Year Plan leading to more than satisfac¬
tory development on many sides.

Income rose 18$, industrial

output ratio increased from 100 in 19?1 to 132.6 in 1956.

The

real investment of banks, shares and debentures, does not in¬
crease in proportion beyond 3# of the total investment.

Even

if the category, Fixed Deposits is taken as a long term invest¬
ment made by the banks, this total fails to increase beyond

. #.

3 5

This apparent lack of interest in corporate industrial
investment prompts the assertion that the operations of the
commercial banks in the long term capital market are confined
to the purchase and sale of government and other trustee
securities.

This reluctance has been attributed to many causes.

The expansion of the banking activity received impetus
during the second world war.

The surpluses, earned and re¬

ceived, which, under normal circumstances, would have been
diverted to industrial investments, were invested in govern¬
ment securities.

As time passed, this reliance on the invest¬

ment in the Gilt-edged market became a set feature of commer¬
cial banking operation.
cash in liquidity.

Government securities are next to

The Indian banker has always had to keep

himself prepared for a possible run on the bank.

This accounts

for not only the high cash ratios maintained but also for the
high percentage of Governmental security investment.

A Reserve

Bank report states
next to cash and balance with banks, Treasury bills
rank as a highly liquid asset which also yields an
adequate return and can be converted into cash almost

instantaneously. For this reason they occupy an
important place (in the banker*s portfolio).^
The return aspect of the industrial securities should not be
overlooked.

Industrial firms in Indi§ have had a very dis¬

couraging record with regard to dividends and returns.

Com¬

panies like Hindustan Motors Limited did not pay any dividend
for periods as long as thirteen years.

When Indian Cable

Company decided to pay a dividend commensurate with its earn¬
ings that year (which would have compensated in some measure
for the absence of any dividend whatsoever over the past 20
years) the Governmental regulation of dividends, which limits
non-taxable dividend to 6$, hindered the distribution of
dividends.

(These by no means are isolated instances.

For

a tabulated information regarding the nonpayment of dividends,
see Table A.l in Appendix I.)
Under such circumstances, it is understandable that
the banking companies should be reluctant to lock up their
funds for any appreciable time without a guarantee either of
a fair return or of a speedy resale.
Another explanation of this line of policy adopted by
the Indian banks emphasizes the "Heritage" point of view.

It

is pointed out that In the matters of working principles, the
Indian banks have been modeling themselves on British

lines.

It is well known that
the British banks consider that their proper function
is the provision of current finances for industry.
Short
loans in the form of an overdraft or in the form of a
separate loan account have been readily granted. But
it has never been their policy to furnish permanent
funds. They are reluctant to lock up their funds.^

4?
Another statement contends that
the practice of joint stock banks in India with regard
to industrial finance, is based largely on the British
tradition of commercial banking, under which banks as
a rule provide only the working capital requirements of
the industries on the security of floating assets and
eschew long term advances against fixed assets.^
In other words, the Indian banks are governed by
Real Bills Doctrine (which maintains that commercial
banks should make only short term self liquidating
productive loans.^
It could be argued that limited assistance by banks
is a feature found in countries other than India.

Examples

could be cited from American banks* investment and loan
policies.

In Table III.5, it is noticed that the commercial

banks do not have enough stock holding to qualify for a
separate listing.

A separate table, Table III.6 indicates

that the total corporate bond holding in i960 was 1.3# of the
total bonds outstanding.

These figures compare very favorably

with those obtained for Indian banks.

However, active partic¬

ipation by banks should not be considered a novel feature of
banking business.
In Germany it has been found that the banks take a
very active part not only in promoting new concerns but also
managing needs for all long terra finances of these industries.
When a question arose of promoting a new concern, the Bank
would prepare a preliminary survey and decide the kind of
securities to be offered on the market.

It was common for

these Banks to buy up all the securities thus offered and
hold on to them till such time when these were offered on the
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TABLE III.?
CORPORATE STOCK:

AMOUNTS OUTSTANDING

(In billions of dollars)

19W
Market Value . .

1950

1952

1956

1958

I960

.

.

111.0

146.0

186.0

338.0

418.0

442.0

Consumer and non
Profit. . .

.

102.4

133.7

169.4

306.3

376.9

391.5

»

Savings Institutions

.2

.2

,3

.7

.9

.8

Insurance.

3.9

6.5

8.6

15.4

19.7

24.7

Open end investment
companies •

1.0

2.0

3.3

7.9

11.7

14.8

.8

.7

.7

.7

.6

.6

Brokers & Dealers

Source: Board of Governors. FRS, Flow of Funds
1946-60, Supplement 5, December 1961.
p. w.

TABLE III.6

COMMERCIAL BANKS CONTRIBUTION TO BONDS1 IN U.S

■

1946

1950

•

1954

1956

1958

I960

BONDS OUTSTANDING

24.7

35.7

50.1

56.4

68.4

74.9

Taken up by the
COMMERCIAL BANKS

2.2

2.2

1 .9

1.3

1.3

1.0

Source:

Ibid.. P. 89*

*+7
market to different investors.

Thus the Bank became the party

offering these shares on the market.

With its own prestige

to back it up (support to be valued) it was not difficult to
have them subscribed them to.

This operation was done by a

single bank or by a consortium of many banks.

It was also

customary for the banks to take up as an investment a
sizable portion of the stock offered.
activities served two interests.

The bank in such

On the one hand, the

expertize in the field of company promotion and stock float¬
ation accumulated by these banks was made available to the
new entrepreneurs.

The entrepreneurs benefited from this

system since they were assured of capital.

On the other

hand, the very fact that these banks were prepared to back
the venture and subscribe to the capital issue, was a
guarantee enough for the general investor.
Another feature of the bank assistance in the field
of industrial finance, was the system of current accounts main¬
tained by the firms.

The basic principle employed was simple.

In a current account relationship (which is different from a
checking account transaction) between two parties, claims
arise on both sides.
These claims were not settled individually but were
treated as items in an account of which the balance
was struck periodically.g
Advantages out of this system were two-fold:
The average German firm depended to a remarkable
extent on this arrangement not only for its working
funds but also for the purpose of extending its
permanent assets in anticipation of recourse to the
investment market.
7

48
From the banker’s point of view
it was a continuous (and important) connexion and
thus gave the bank an insight into most of the money
transactions of a customer; it also provided much of
the data required for estimating the risk involved in
the intermittent capital transactions; and it led up
to capital transactions even more directly, in the
sense that improvements and extensions of plant were
often undertaken by means of current account credit
which was repaid later with the proceeds of a capital
issue.10

Lending Practices of Commercial Banks?
In spite of these precedents, Indian banks prefer to
follow their own procedures.

Tables 111.7* III.8 and III.9

show the industry-wise Sources of Funds over three periods.
A correlative analysis of the percentage of bank loans to
total sources of funds and rates of growth is found in Table
III.10.

The results obtained indicate that industrial growth

had no relation to bank loans.
rapidly growing industries.

Bank loans did not flow to the

If in the analysis a positive

correlation was found, it could have been surmised that in¬
dustries using a high percentage of bank loans to total
sources of funds achieved rapid growth through bank loans.
Table III.10 indicates that there was no such positive corre¬
lation evident.

This means that industries that were new

and "growth” industries did not require or receive assistance
from the banks.

In other words, it was the old established

industries that depended on the banks for their finances.
What then influenced the bank decision was not the intrinsic
value of a firm, but the intangibles like the prestige of a
firm, and the prestige and influence of those associated with
that firm.

This is so, because the prestige, power and
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TABLE III.10
PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANIES:
PERCENT BANK LOANS TO
TOTAL SOURCES OF FUNDS AND RATES OF GROWTH
CORRELATION ANALYSIS

1946/?1

1951/55

1955/58

r 1.2

-0.0549

-0.3846

-0.1209

r 1.3

-0.1429

-0.2747

-0.0330

r 1.4

-0.0549

-0.2088

-0.0330

Variable
•

1 - Bank loans as percentages of total funds*
2 - Annual compound rate of growth of net total assets
during the period.
3 - Annual compound rate of growth of inventories during
the period.

h - Annual compound rate of growth of net fixed assets
during the period.'
r -

2R
n/2(n-l)

- 1

rs

correlation coefficient

ns

number of ranks (14)

R:

computed by standard method according to
G. H. Yule et al.« Introduction to vthe Theory of
Statistics. Charles Griffen cl Co., Ltd., 19$0
London. Pp. 253-309.

Source: B. B. Patel, Commercial Banks1 Lending
Practices in India. Unpublished Management Thesis, I961
k.I.T., Boston7 Pp. 25.
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influence of those associated with the firm is inalienable
from that of the firm itself.

Other factors lead to the same

result.
A set of tables is introduced here.
lists the growth of advances by the sector:

Table III.11
herein the

computed growth in advances to industry is the largest, 68.71$
over the decade.

A partial detail in actual figures (Table

III.12) shows a trend in absolute money terms and in percentage
figures for industrial advances to increase at the expense
of its closest rival, Trade and Commerce.

Table III.13 lists

computed increase or decrease in the bank advances to dif¬
ferent sectors, with Engineering and Cotton Textiles benefitting most.

A breakdown into actual figures in Table TII.14

shows what percentage these advances formed of the total
working capital needs of different industries.

Except for

two industries, Iron & Steel and Cement, there can be
noticed a very high percentage of bank advances in the total
working capital needs.

Engineering industries absorbed the

highest percentage of 56.7$*

(The reasons for Iron and Steel

and Cement industry needing so much less capital would have
to be sought elsewhere.

Iron and Steel is the only industry

which has successfully floated debenture issue in India.

It

is a closed group with no outside competition—the Indian
Iron and Steel Company Limited managed by Martin Burn Limited
and the Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited managed by Tatas
form over 90$ of the production in the country.

In a similar

fashion the Cement industry could be considered a closed one,
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TABLE III.13
SECTORWISE DISTRIBUTION OF BANK ADVANCES

Sector

June
Amount n s

Industry
24-1.2
Commerce
292.3
Agriculture
12.5
Personal &
Professional 54.8
All others
24.9.

June
v6
Amount $5

38 .6
46 .7
2 .0

300.4 ?9.0

390.4

356.3 46.7
17.7 2.3

414.3
22.9

7.6
4,1

61.1
.36.3

8 .8
4 .0

58.2

31.3

June 58
Amount ?s

45.3

2.5

441.9
412.9
18.5

6.6
.3.9.

64.0
37.3

6.6
3.8

42.2
44.8

763.9 100. <3 925.0 100.0

625.6 100 .0

Total

June 57
Amount %s

42.6
1.9

974.6 100.0

Amounts are all in 00,000s.
Sources Dr. C . B. Mamoria. "Organisation and Finances
of Industries in India ," Kitab Mahal, Bombay, i960. Pp. 573*

TABLE III.14
SHARE OF BANK ADVANCES IN WORKING CAPITAL NEEDS

Working capital

Industry
Cotton Textile
Jute
Iron <$c Steel
Engineering
Cement
Sugar
Chemicals
Sources

157.4
33.9
34.3
39.3

8.8
46.9
24.4

Ibid.. Pp. 573•

Banking Advance
61.0
13.4
5.9
22.3
1.2

13.5
9.2

$$

38.7
39.5
17.2
56.7
13.6
28.9
37.7
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the Associated Cement companies and the Dalmia-Jain group
forming the overwhelmingly dominant interests.)
Two important inferences with regard to the participa¬
tion of banks in industrial financing could be drawn.

(1) The

long term investment of banks is only 3.5$ of its total invest¬
ment and its contribution could thus be considered negligible.
(2) Banks are contributing an increasing amount by making
available credit to the extent of 45,3% of its total advances
to the working capital requirement of the industries; this
contribution amounted from 56.7$ (highest) to 28.9$ (lowest).
These advances could have been made against a security cr
without.

Two tables are referred to here.

Table II1.15

cites the security requirement on banks* advances.

When

taken together, the three heads—Raw Materials, Finished
goods and Stock and Trade, constitute 47$ of the total advance.
Fixed Assets, Land and Buildings and Plant and Equipment
form only 6$ of the advances, while Government securities
and shares form not more than 8$ of the advance.
over the decade is cited in Table III.16.

A survey

In case of an

industry like Cotton Textiles, the Industrial Raw material
would be an agricultural product.

Allowing for such over¬

lapping and taking into consideration these, it can be seen
that the category "Industrial Raw Material1’ has increased by
51$.

It can be deduced from this that for the purpose of

granting loans and advances, Inventory forms the biggest
security a company can give.

Real Estate has declined over

the years while assets of industrial concerns and shares of
companies form only 12$ of the total advance.
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TABLE III.I?
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ON OUTSTANDING BANK LOANS
TO MEDIUM AND SMALL SCALE BUSINESS
(Percentages)

Total

Type of Security

Corporate

Non Corporate

Documentary Bills

11

10

11

Land and Buildings

3

6

5

Plant and Equipment

2

1

1

*
Raw Material

*
7

3

4

Finished Goods

11

2

4

Stock and Trade
*

32

41

39

Gov*t Sec. and Shares

8

8

8

Fixed Deposits

1

4

2

Jewelry

-

2

1

Composite Advances

5

3

3

Miscellaneous

1

2

2

Total secured loans

82

80

81

Unsecured loans

18

20

19

Total loans

Rs. 540,700

Rs. 2,027,700

*

Rs. 2,568,400

Source: B. B. Patel, "Commercial Banks *.Lending
Practices In India". Unpublished Management Thesis, 1961,
M.t.T., Boston, Pp. 93•
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Put differently this would mean that inventory figures
as the greatest security for the company.

Since inventory is

a fluid security, (as contrasted with static security like
buildings, plant and machinery) price fluctuations either for
the raw materials or for the finished products can change the
intrinsic hypothecable value of the inventory.

This would make

it difficult for the bank, or for that matter any lender that
has accepted inventory as security, to redeem or recover the
original loan.

The expenses involved in this recovery are

also a major consideration.

Since the hypothecable value of

the inventory is thus a potential hazard, this requirement of
security becomes a mere matter of formality.

The factor

dominant in influencing the decisions of the bank has to be
sought elsewhere.

It is here that the nersonal guarantee

and the personal influence that emerges as the prime lever.
One indication of this is the prevalence of practices like
the Two Name papers.
For an industrial concern that is seeking accommoda¬
tion for a long-or medium-term loan on the basis of its own
reputation without or with hypothecation of assets, the banks
insisted that the papers be endorsed by a second signatory—
this second signatory standing security and surety to the
ft

entire transaction thus lending the prestige of his name to
the deal.
The distinguishing feature of this system is the
dependence on the personal guarantee of a third party,
presumably unconnected with the company applying for the loan.
Since it Is quite possible that in the absence of such a
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guarantee the company may fail to secure the loan, the im¬
portance of this guarantee cannot be minimized.
There are other methods in practice, which could be
justified only on the grounds that they originate in bonds of
mutual faith and trust backed by personal guarantees of the
entrepreneurs.

According to one such method, once delivery

of goods has been accepted the invoices drawn by the company
on the company on the customer are submitted to the bank.

On

the strength of the invoice advance is granted to the company
up to a maximum of 80$ of the amount involved in the invoice.
This advance is of a nature of an overdraft, since the advance
is automatically terminated once the accounts between the
company and its customer are settled.
Another version of this would involve execution of
a power of attorney by the company in favor of the bank,
authorizing the bank to collect all the dues arising out of
bona-fide sales by the company.

Because of the power of

attorney, it is possible for the bank to grant liberal advances.
It would be extremely difficult to classify the ad¬
vances made and the methods used for these advances.

These

are not simple security backed advances, since there is no
hypothecation involved.
Exchange.

These are not HUNDIS or Bills of

At best these could be described as accommodations

granted by the bank to the company, because the company could
muster enough prestige and influence to back its demands up.
As cited earlier in the discussion, until the estab¬
lishment of the Reserve Bank of India there was no central
authority on the financial or monetary matters.

In 19^9* the
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Reserve Bank was nationalized and became the source of strength,
guidance and directive for financial and banking sectors of
Indian economy.

The Banking Companies Act of 19^9 and sub¬

sequent amendments to it greatly increased the powers of the
Reserve Bank viz-a-viz the banks in India.

The banks have to

possess a license from the Reserve Bank which may be cancelled
if the Reserve Bank Is of the opinion that the affairs of the
bank are conducted in a manner which is detrimental to the
depositors.

It is necessary for every bank to submit a re¬

turn giving full details of all the unsecured loans and
advances granted to the companies in which either it has, or
Its directors have, interests.

A baric may be prevented, by

an injunction from the Reserve Bank, from granting advances
and loans which are not good business.

A complete statement

giving all the details, classifying advances and Investments
in respect to Industry, Commerce and agriculture, has to be
filed with the Reserve Bank.

The affairs of a bank may be

investigated and can be asked to close down if sc desired.
Exacting as these restrictions may sound it should be remem¬
bered that these have been necessitated by the many mal¬
practices in grants of loans and advances as well as invest¬
ments resulting in bank crises.

In India, it was recognized

early that a bank is a valuable asset for any individual
industrial group.
that group.

Thus banks were started with aid from

The House of Tatas became aligned with the Central

Bank of India and the Bank of India.

The House of Birlas

depended on the United Commercial Eank.

The House of
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Dalmia-Jains on the Punjab National Bank,

Though these

groups cannot be held responsible for all the malpractices
(like unsecured advances from the banks to concerns under
their management; unsecured advances to the directors; grant
of loans and advances by the banks on its own shares and so
on), they should be given credit for the idea of a group
oriented bank; an idea which in less scrupulous hands re¬
sulted in disasters.

The Two Name paper represents a well

intentioned precautionary measure which was mishandled and
allowed to fall into a cliche and ultimately used to selfish
ends.

For example, one way to ensure that the second

signatory in the Two Name paper is worthy of trust and con¬
fidence was to insist that he be not connected with the
debtor firm in any form of general partnership.

Thus the

Managing Agent of a firm automatically became the prime
candidate for the second signature.

Coupled with the prestige

of the Managing Agents this practice of Managing Agent
guaranteeing the promissory notes of their own managed
concerns led to virtual abandonment of the cautionary zeal.
In this way the curious interdependence between the Managing
Agents and their banks was formed, a relationship which
prompted Dr. C. Jeidel, the German banking expert, to remark
before the Central Banking Enquiry Committee that the banks
are spoiled by the managing agents and the managing agents
are spoiled by the banks.

CHAPTER FOUR
THE MANAGING AGENCY SYSTEM
An analysis is presented how this system of industrial
organization, unique to India only, has come into being.
Its nature and operation are discussed.
The financial contribution of this system is of much
greater significance in the present context and attention
has been given to explain the diverse modes how this
system organizes for industrial finances.
The importance of the system in the present day India
has been discussed and far reaching influence of the
system has been presented.
The fact that the managing agencies are typical examples
of family oriented group minded philosophy is presented
leading to observation how the groups, through the
system, control vast sectors of the economy.

64

65
Historical Background;
The managing agency system is peculiar to India.

One

may trace the origin of the system to the state of vacuum
created by the abolition, around the middle of the last century,
of the monopoly of trade which the Bast India Company had in
India.

This presented a valuable opportunity and a dour

challenge to the enterprising group of traders and businessmen
which at that time was composed chiefly of British elements.
No one could fail to be attracted by the market potential of
India's vast population—the biggest single market served
exclusively by British businessmen.

India lacked all the

requirements basic for an emergence of any industrialization.
The class of entrepreneurs was non-existent.
was not available.

Venture capital

Agriculture, Land and Heal Estate were

the accepted outlets for investment.

Therefore capital was

not forthcoming readily for industrial and/or commercial
investment.

Finally, even if financiers to back industrial

investments and entrepreneurs to run the ventures could be
found, technical skills and know how were altogether absents
At that time India had not progressed beyond the restrictions
imposed by the Middle Age technology.
At this point the managing agency assumed responsi¬
bility for providing India what she could not have herself.
The Charter of 1833 was resuonsible for the encouragement,
which, among other concessions, recognized the right of nonIndians (which in this context could ap^ly only to the British)
to own land in India.

Advantage was promptly taken of this
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provision to tap the natural resources of India and the first
plantations and coal mines were established.
For a number of reasons the development was restricted
in the initial stages only to the British enterprising elements.
Chief among these was the ease with which the British entrepre¬
neurs found it possible to import capital into India.

It was

thus the joint effort of 3ritish capital and entrepreneurial
ability that resulted in the establishment of important Jute,
Plantation and mining industry.
The purely Indian type of managing agency did not
appear till the beginning of the Civil War in the U.S.

The

Cotton textile industry in Great Britain was getting its cotton
from the plantations on the southern states in the U.S.

In

the early sixties, the British industry was suddenly cut from
this source of supply and had to look out for different sources.
One such source was found in India.

The windfall profits,

which the Indian businessmen made, sought new, bold and highly
remunerative avenues of investment in industries and thus over¬
came the lack of venture capital.

Their own long standing ex¬

perience in running their own business houses made up for the
lack of managerial exDerience and the import of foreign tech¬
nicians, mainly from Britain and Germany, filled the gap of
technical skill.
It will be seen that diverse reasons helped to bring
about the evolution of the managing agency system.

Though

the British element was in the forefront, the Indian National
Congress and the "Buy Indian11 movement which it sponsored, was
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very helpful in the promotion of Indian owned and managed
industries.

Consequently, the British element could not but

lessen in importance under this impact and it dwindled to a
level in which one finds that in 1956-57 only 12 important
British managing agency systems working in India.

These

agencies controlled 125 companies with a total paid up capital
outlay of Rs. 258.4 million.

The corresponding figures for

Total Companies at work (exclusive of Insurance and Banking)
was 23,642 having a total paid up capital of Rs. 9,239 million
out of which 5,055 companies, having a total paid up capital
of Rs. 4,654 million were under the control of the managing
agents.
Managing Agency:

Theory and Practice

A managing agency could be described as the
institutional development of industrial organization
where the promotion, finance and administration of
a vast agglomoration of miscellaneous and unrelated
enterprises are controlled by a single firm.
The
managing agency firm may take the organizational
form of a partnership, a private or public limited
company or could be an individual.-^
The Amending Act of 1936 defined the managing agency as
a person, firm or company entitled to the management
of the whole affairs of the company by virtue of an
agreement with the company and under the control and
direction of the directors except to the extent, if
any, otherwise provided for in the agreement ana
includes any person, firm or company, occupying such
a position by whatever name called.0
From the above definitions it can be seen that the
chief function of the managing agents is the formation and
operation of industrial and other enterprises.

They would
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involve three distinct operations:

(1) Responsibilities con¬

nected with pioneering, promoting and launching of industrial
enterprises; (2) Finding different avenues of financing these
enterprises; and (3) Managing and running these concerns*
As the promoters of the enterprise the managing agents
are the trail blazers.

The classic example of this has always

been the promotion of India*s first Iron and Steel combine by
the House of Tatas,

The difficulties this managing agency had

to face were enormous.

The House of Tatas was the managing

agency that was instrumental in locating the deposits of ore,
in acquiring the concessions and in setting up the plant and
machinery.

It had the Herculean task in this process to set

up the whole new township of "Jamshedpur"; since the village
of Sakchi, originally considered as a suitable plant site
was far too deep in the Bengal jungles.
the question of finances.

Host important was

In accordance with customary pro¬

cedure the London money market was approached, however, it
proved to be unresponsive.

The burden therefore fell on the

managing agents and they rose to this challenge.

On the

strength of the influence of the House, aided in no less
manner by the fact that this was a purely Indian enterprise,
the whole amount of

1,630,000 was raised in India—an

astronomical sum for that country at the turn of the century.
The work which the managing agents described >©s that
of transforming an idea into a profit-yielding business.
importance of this promotional aspect of a managing agency
is hard to minimize.

For someone who is accustomed to the

The
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specialized services of different agencies, it is understandably
difficult to visualize a position where, till the establishment
of the National Industrial Development Corporation in 1954
(a government agency responsible for development and promotion
of government backed and/or sponsored projects), there was no
agency or business house responsible or capable of an exclusive
handling of promotion of new enterprises.
The figures in Table IV. 1 should be helpful in empha¬
sizing the role played by the managing agents in company pro¬
motion.

It is evident from this table that as late as 1958/59

the promotional activities of the managing agents are still
prominent, forming as high as
promotion.

52% of the total public company

It should be borne in mind here that this number

is one portion of the overall picture.

The support given

to other newly formed companies in an indirect manner is not
accounted for.

This is presumably because the managing agents

or their friends either have adequate representation on the
Board of Directors of the new company or are assured of a
participation in the affairs of the new company by virtue of
different relationship or connection.

In the same manner,

other groups that promote a particular concern and allow
themselves to be classified as managing agents only after
the concern has been registered and preliminaries have been
completed are not taken into account.

Nor has any mention

been made about the expansion and/or diversificatory activities
undertaken by the managing agents.

If all these figures were

taken into consideration, the participation of the managing
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TABLE IV.1
CONTRIBUTION OF MANAGING AGENTS TO SHARE CAPITAL
OF NEW COMPANIES

YEAR
1

TOTAL COMPANIES
Number Paid Up
Capital
2
3

COMPANIES WITH
MANAGING AGENTS
Number Paid Up
Capital
4
5

!? as

%

of

1951.52

511

7021

62

1372

19.5

1952.53

181

2077

26

441

21.2

1953.54-

199

2275

25

324

14.2

1954.55

219

17W8

23

1708

9.8

1955.56

186

6789

10

530

7.8

1956.57

82

4411

6

1452

32.9

1957.58

64

5264

11

1100

20.9

1958.59

58

5867

3

3050

52.0

(The numbers relate

to Public Companies only.)

(Figures are in Rs. 00,000.)
Source? National Council of Applied Economic
Research, "Managing Agency System.” Asia Publishing House,
New Delhi, 1959, Pp. 67-7?.
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agents would loom much larger than the Table IV.1 indicates.
Besides promoting new industries the managing and
running the existing ones also forms an important activityon part of the managing agents.

In one sense it could be

even more important part of their overall function since it
is customary for managing agents to assume control of other
companies.

In this way McLeod & Company took over the agency

of Alexandria Jute Mills Company Ltd. from Messrs. Begg Dunlop
and Co.; Sri Krishna Investment Co. Ltd. of Clive Mills
Company Limited from Bird and Co.; Kalyanji Mavji & Co. of
Bengal Bhatdee Co. Ltd. from Andrew Yule and Company.
According to Indian practices, the affairs of any
public comuany are under the direct authority of the Board of
Directors.

With the managing agents in the picture, this

format is retained while the actual power tends to shift
into the hands of the managing agents.

In case of companies

where the managing agents hold a controlling or a substantial
interest in the form of stocks the Board turns into a rubber
stamp body nominated by and acceptable to the managing agents.
How the managing agents come to acquire unlimited control of
the management of the company is best illustrated from the
following citations from two agreements.

In 19^8 the Bird

and Company concluded a managing agency agreement in Calcutta
with Landsdown Jute Co. Ltd., whereby the managing agents were,
subject to the control and direction of the Board of Directors,
to manage the affairs of the company, except where
such control and/or direction constitutes a
derogation of the powers of the managing agents^
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to manage the affairs of the company under any conditions.
The South India Agency Limited became the managing agents of
Rodier Textile Mills Limited, operating
under the control and direction of the Board of
Directors except in the discharge of their duties
and exercise of their powers.^
The list of duties and powers included almost every important
field of management; the appointment and dismissal of person¬
nel, including the officers of the company; the power to
negotiate, conclude and honor contracts of every type for and
on behalf of the company; the power to make and receive pay¬
ments or enter into financial arrangements; the power to open
and operate bank accounts, retain the monies of the company
in their own name and to create charge on the company's assets.
In many cases it was possible for the managing agents to be
appointed the Purchasing Agents and/or the Sales Agents.
Having under their control and direct authority so many diverse
powers, it is no wonder that the managing agents became a
prime mover in the corporate affairs.

The managing agent is

the key figure when one considers an agency that has such
powers in many different concerns including such divers fields
as iron and steel aircraft, locomotives, automobiles and truck
manufacture, machinery and machine tools, textiles, chemicals,
toiletries, radio and communications, banking, insurance,
investment, hotels, scientific research and many others.

In

this single instance the tremendous influence of such firms
will be apparent.
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Managing Agents and Corporate Finances;
However, It is the financial aspect of this system that
is most important and relevant to the discussion here.

There

are different ways the managing agents can influence the finances
of the company they manage.

More often than not it is the

managing agent that has promoted the company and therefore the
preliminary expenses are paid by him.

(These are invariably

recovered from the company, but this recovery does not lessen
in any way the importance or the value of this initial con¬
tribution, especially since this amount can at times form as
high a percentage to the total paid up capital as 10#.)

Once

the company has been promoted, the contribution of the managing
agents comes in the form of purchase of stock.

The amount of

this stock participation has shown considerable variation
over the years and differs not only from one managing agent
to another but also from one managed company to another, even
if both are controlled by the same managing agent.

Thus the

evidence given before the Tariff Commission in 1932 indicates
that the managing agents in Ahmedabad area held stacks varying
from 60 to 85# of the total subscribed capital in the cotton
textile mills managed by them.

The managing agents of Basanti

Mills held 80# of the stock, while four of the partners of
the managing agency firm and their relatives together held
25*000 shares out of a subscribed total of 51*980 shares.

In

19^5 the situation was similar—for example, the managing
agents of Sri Digvijay Cement Company Limited, Messrs. Luxmi
Agents, took uo 20# of the subscribed capital stock of the
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company.

Motwane Limited contributed 32$ of the subscribed

capital stock of the Motwane Radio Manufacturing Company
Limited and brought the company into being.

A different type

of contribution was effected by Amalgam Limited whereby
together with their collaborators, they contributed the entire
capital outlay of India Piston Private Limited; Amalgam hold¬
ing the majority interest.
It should not be assumed that the holding of the
managing agents is always that high.

Figures in Table IV.2

refer to the survey made of the more important managing
agents in the Jute and Coal industry.

It should be noticed

here that the Andrew Yules, controlling fifteen coal com¬
panies, maintain a holding which ranges between 3? to 22$.
At the same time they are able to restrict their holdings
to a level as low as 7% in one of their Jute mills.

It

should be understood here that their contributory level is
by no means rigid.

It is quite likely that the managing

agents may change their holding—by increasing or decreasing
it.

Thus in case of Standard Jute Company, the managing

agents, Bird and Company, had no holding at all in 1951?
bought 676 equity shares in 1954 and raised this number
to 975 in 1955.

The holding of Messrs. James Finlay & Co.

shows an unusual degree of variation.
the data in Table IV.3.

This may be seen in

One reason for this seemingly erratic

fluctuation could be attributed to the financial well-being
of the managed company.

It is found that when the confidence

of the investors or the rate of profits is low, the managing
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TABLE IV.2
SHARES HELD BY MANAGING AGENTS IN MANAGED
COMPANIES

Managing Agent

Mills managed

Andrew Yule & Co.

8

Begg Dunlop & Co.

4

Kettlewell Bullen
Jardine & Skinner
MacKinnon
McLeod
Barry

2
4
2
4
2

Managing Agent
Andrew Yule

% of shareholding

29,24,14,30,43,21
26,7.
35,30,10,13
23,16,13,15,17
15,16
15,38

ifis13-"7
ttfr'72

Collieries Managed

15

Heilgers

7

Martin & Co.

7

Shaw Wallace
Low & Co.
McNeill & Co.

6

5
7
j

% of shareholding

43,30,31,27,25,22,
55,26,46,38,22,34,
40,30,51.
44,31,68,57,44,25,
28
19,22,31,79,18,73,
74
37,47,34,24,36,42
68,17,33,28,26
27,97,30,56,81,
38,65.

Adapted from: Raghbir Singh Bhatia, Role of Foreign
Investment in Economic Development of India, Unpublished
Thesis, Micro-^ilm obtained at the Library of Congress,
Washington, D. C.
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TABLE IV.3
CHANGES IN SHAREHOLDING OF MANAGING AGENTS IN
MANAGED COMPANIES

YEAR
Percent
Holding

1918

1920.21

78

66

1922.23
91

1934

1935.36

0.002

63

1951

38

Source:
S. K . Basu. Managing Agency System. World
Press, Calcutta, 1958 . Pp. 354-360.

TABLE IVA
VALUE OF SHARES HELD BY MANAGING AGENTS IN MANAGED
COMPANIES

Range of
No. of
subscribed Companies
capital
in each
group
00,000

Total
subscribed
capital in
each group
00,000

Value of
shares
held by
Mng. Agts .
00,000

% of total
subscribed
capital
held by MAs

Up to 10

10

37.41

10.09

26.97

10-20

12

185.71

45.27

24.38

20-30

10

253-16

89.72

35.44

30-50

lb

591.75

157.68

26.65

50-80

7

466.72

133.98

28.71

80-100

8

732.12

188.34

25.73

Source:
National Council of Applied Economic
Research, Managing Agency System. Asia Publishing House,
New Delhi, 1959, P. 69.
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agents usually carry the burden of corporate finances them¬
selves*

It is also found that in case of those companies

that have a good profitability record or are considered
successful and well supported by the investing public, the
managing agents prefer to have low holdings.

For example,

the Andrew Yules have no holding at all in Belvedere Jute
Mills, considered to be a sound and successful concern, while
they held 22.2% of the equity stock in Port Engineering
Company in 1957, as compared to a holding of 18.48# in 1951.
In the analysis carried out in 1958, when 66 public
limited companies in Bombay area were surveyed, the results
show an overall holding of 20-25%.

These figures, referred

in Table IV.4, could be taken to represent a general picture.
Two notes could be appended here.

It is not always

possible to ascertain the financial contribution of the
managing agents with any certitude.

The reason for this is

that in India, the term "relatives, associates and friends”
is flexible to an extent not found in any of the western
countries.

Thus, on the register of the company, maintained

according to the requirement of the law by the company, one
may find many shares standing in the name of one party.

For

example, a mill in Bombay, 2,863 Preferred shares out of a
total of 4,000 stood in the name of a Maharaja.

This con¬

tribution would not have been made at all had the managing
agents not been the prime mover in the transaction.

To what

extent the managing agents have been influential in attract¬
ing such finances is impossible to determine.

This difficulty
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arises because of the personal factors, which are predominant
in these instances, do not lend themselves to calculations in
terms of dollars and cents.
Then again, the practice of holding stock in the form
of Bearer shares or "benami" (lit, "Nameless") as they are
known in India, precludes a precise classification, even when
they are known to have been held and contributed by the managing
agents.
Thus the actual contribution of the managing agents to
the capital stock of the company would have to rank much higher
than the figures cited so far have shown.
Besides equity participation, the managing agents are
known to have been influential in securing long term finances
for their companies.

This can take two forms.

The company

may either receive direct loans from the managing agents or
the managing agents may attract Deposits from the Public for
the company.
One would get some idea of the extent to which the
company may stand indebted to the managing agents from a
reference made by Sir Leslie Hudson in his speech before the
India Legislative Assembly—
They (the managing agents) made unsecured advances to
the extent of Rs. 2,800,000 and in addition to this took
up nearly 95# of the Debenture issue the company had
floated.^
This is by no means the customary percentage of the contri¬
bution made by the managing agents, but should nonetheless
indicate the extreme to which the managing agents are prepared
to go.

A fair picture could be obtained from the three tables
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presented together here,

Tables IV.5, IV.6 and IV.7.

Table

IV.5 has the statewise distribution of the leading activities
of the managing agents.

It should be noticed that in case of

comparatively highly developed state such as Bombay or West
Bengal, the managing agents are responsible for only 12.58 and
17.47#, respectively, of the total loans and advances received
by their companies.

This percentage shows a rise from 23.05#

in Madras to 52.35# in Mysore to reach the high point of
97.14# in Andhra.

In case of the survey of 64 cotton textile

mills in Bombay and 56 mills in Ahmedabad the amounts re¬
ceived from the managing agents, attain the level of 21# and
24# respectively.

In Table IV.7 a trend can be noticed:

the

smaller the company in size the higher is the share of the
managing agents.

In case of companies that have paid up

capital between Rs. 0—1,000,000 and between Rs. 2 million
to Rs. 3 million, the percentage of the direct loans from the
managing agents amounts to almost 50#; while in case of firms
having capital above Rs. 10 million, this contribution dwindles
down to a meager 0.79#«
Another way the managing agents influence financing
directly is by attracting deposits from private parties, a
feature that is peculiar only to India.

Such a deposit is a

fixed-time deposit, usually for a medium-long term, bearing
a fixed rate of interest.

This differs from the Debentures

in one marked respect in that this is not a bond issue and
as such is not offered on the market.

The deposits however

do create a charge on the assets of the company and rank first
in case of liquidation and take precedence over other obliga¬
tions including institutional advances and loans.

The essence

bo
TABLE IV.5
LENDING ACTIVITIES OF THE MANAGING AGENTS

STATE

LOANS
ADVANCED
BY
MANAGING
AGENTS

LOANS
GUARAN¬
TEED BY
MANAGING
AGENTS

Andhra

32

2

Bombay

376

Madras

LOANS
FROM
BANKS

TOTAL
LOANS
AND
ADVANCES

2 & 3
AS
A %
OF
5

1

35

97.14

114

3404

3894

12.58

61

107

561

729

23.05

W. Bengal

96

20

548

664

17.47

Mysore

36

53

81

170

52.35

Delhi

3?

58

224

317

29.34

Figures obtained from:
11 Figures delating to 1340
Managing Agents managing 1720 Companies*1: Research &
Statistics bivision. Company Law Administration, Government
of India$ New Delhi, 1951-1952.
TABLE IV.6
FINANCES OF COMPANIES UNDER THE MANAGING AGENTS IN
INDIA

64 MILLS IN BOMBAY
AMOUNT % OF TOTAL

56 MILLS IN AHMEDABAD
AMOUNT
% OF TO^At

Amounts received from
Managing Agents • • .
From Banks.

532
226

21
9

264
42

24
4

By Public Deposits. . .

237

11

426

39

Share Capital.

1214

49

3*+0

32

Debentures •••••••

238

10

8

1

Source*
P. A. Wadia & K. T. Merchant, ”Our Economic
Problem.” Vora & Co., 1957* Bombay. Pp. 625.
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TABLE IV.7
LOANS TO MANAGED COMPANIES BY MANAGING AGENTS

Range
of Paid
up Cap.

No. of
Cos in
each
group

Debentures

Total
Bank
Loans

Guaranteed by
MAs

Direct
loans
by MAs

Other
loans

Total
loans

0-10

77 /

5.oo

68.46

31.55

81.90

37.41

200.30

10-20

25

73.63

58.60

25.6 7

11.50

-

199.18

20-30

9

7.00

20.49

15.73

24.17

-

51.66

30-50

lb

113.35

180.94

12.69

34.54

10.95

342.42

50-70

8

80.73

427.69

18.00

78.09

7.65

594.16

70-100

4

30.00

172.03

-

1.65

2.84

206.52

100 up

6

20.00

138.85 138.73

0.79 677.24*1972.72

♦World Bank loan to Indian Iron and Steel Company
Limited, 92$ of total of other loans.
Source: NCAER, "Managing Agency SystemAsia Pub¬
lishing House, New Delhi ,1959,'" Pp .77.

TABLE IV.8
LOANS GUARANTEED BY MANAGING AGENTS

Large
sized
Companies

Total
loans
(i)
Secured from Banks

Guaranteed
by MAs
(2)

2 as $
of 1
(3)

38.40

27.20

70.8

4.35

1.37

31.5

30.69
Medium
sized
Secured from Banks 1493.90
Companies Unsecured from
Banks
255.10
Govt, and State
Agencies 186.00

2.51

8.2

777.70

52.1

Unsecured from Banks
Govt, and State Agen
cies

Source:

Ibid.. Pp. 73-7V.

72.4
9

82.6

-

28.4

bb.b

of these deposits is that they are solicited personally and
privately either directly or through agents.

There does not

exist any organized agency for soliciting these.

Its success

with one company and failure with another is essentially con¬
nected with the managing agents of the particular firm.

The

system is more popular in Bombay and Ahmedabad, though
practiced throughout in the country.

One reason for their

popularity is that
people trusted their savings to men whom they knew
and with whom they could deal without the formalities
necessary in dealing with the Banks.^
Table IV.6 indicates that 11# of the total advances were
composed of public deposits in Bombay, while the corresponding
figure for Ahmedabad was 39#.
The number of managing agents that manage only one
company far outstrips the number of the managing agents that
manage more than one, although it is the latter type that
affords the example of the type described hereafter.

It was

discussed earlier how the managing agents control companies
in more than one sphere of Industry.

No two companies can

either be expected to operate in similar ways, or have identical
financial requirements.

This gives the managing agents a chance

to bolster the finances of one company by "Loans and Advances"
from another company—both of these being under the same manage¬
ment.

Advantage is taken of the sound positions of one company

to help out the other company in difficulties.
done in two ways.

This can be

The surplus funds of one may be transferred

as a "Loan" to the needy company.

The temporary or short term

nature of such loans is illusory because an almost automatic
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renewal of the loan for as long a period as necessary (the
decision being that of the managing agents) turns this into
a mode of long-term financing.

The funds may also be raised

on the credit worthiness of one company and advanced to another
under the same management.

For example, in Bombay, the Swan

Mills had received as a loan the sum of Rs. 550,000 from
Finlay Mills, as did the Gold Mohur Mills a sum of Rs. 300,000t
all the three mills being under the management of the same
agency.

In Calcutta, 50,000 shares of the Megna Mills Company

Limited, out of a total of 61208 subscribed shares, were taken
up by the India Jute Company Limited.

In addition, India

Jute advanced an unusually high sum of Rs. 6,552,000 to Megna
Mills;

Needless to say both these firms were managed by the

same agency.

From this type of inter-firm financing not even

the most reputed Agency Houses are immune.

The Swadeshi Mills

and the Ahmedabad Advance Mills took up Rs. 6,000,000 worth
of debentures out of a total of Rs. ten million floated by the
Tata Mills:

All three managed by the foremost agency house in

India—the House of Tatas.
As has been emphasized in discussing the policies of
Banks with reference to industrial financing, Equity participa¬
tion is in disfavor.

However, Table IV.8 indicates that their

loans and advances form a heavy proportion.

The point of

importance here is that all these loans, whether secured
unsecured, have been guaranteed by the managing agents.

or
This

would mean that if the managing agents had not been prepared
to guarantee or stand surety to these loans, and if these

guarantees had not been acceptable to the banks a source of
finance amounting to 70.8$ and 31•5$ in case of large size
companies and 52.1$ and 28.4$ in case of medium sized companies
would have been unavailable.

When taken into consideration

that these loans form the working capital employed by the
companies, the important role played by the managing agents
can perhaps be better understood.

It is interesting to note

that unsecured loans form as high a percentage as 31*5$ and
28.4$ of the contributions.
any collateral.

These loans are obtained without

The banks are prepared to advance these sums

on the guarantee that the managing agents themselves would be
responsible for honoring the commitments involved in such a
transaction.

This personal guarantee is the most important

factor in influencing the decision of the bank in favor of
the company.
The conditions imposed by the banks on their lending
policies stem directly from the two aspects of the managing
agency system.

Firstly, it is the managing agents that are

in control of the day to day management of the company and
are therefore in a better position to know how the company
fares.

Secondly, the resources at their command justify

the confidence the banks have in these managing agents.

If

to these two the incalculable facotrs of prestige and in¬
fluence are added, then it should not be difficult to under¬
stand why the managing agents play such a crucial role in
Indian corporate financing.

CHAPTER FIVE
THE ORGANIZED CAPITAL MARKET
Four aspects of the organized capital market are taken
for consideration here* How they have come to develop
and how they have similarity to similar western insti¬
tutions is discussed.
Their organization in the Indian context is discussed.
How, in spite of the organizational progress, the
original philosophy has remained unshaken and how these
modern methods and institutions are used by different
groups to retain and possibly enlarge their grasp over
the financial matters is presented.
The factual data presented leads to the conclusion
structurally the Indian capital market has progressed
very well. However, the peculiar methods of operation
maintain the traditional philosophy and make it
impossible to have any progress there.
Family and
group are as influential as they were earlier.
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The term Organized Capital Market comprises those
agencies whose primary business is the channeling of the
•fe

country*s financial resources, private as well as corporate,
to profitable investment.

For the purpose of discussion

here, four sections of the Organized Market are considered.
These are the Insurance companies, the Investment Trusts,
the Underwriters and the New Issue Market and the Stock
Exchange.

In India all these institutions are in existence

and in operation.

Yet where corporate investment is con¬

cerned, there are no scientific, modern principles governing
it.

What govern the actual practice are factors like the

family oriented, group minded philosophy.
The Insurance Companies}
The origins of the insurance business in India go
back as far as 1818 when the Oriental Life Insurance Company
was organized in Calcutta.

The development of the insurance

business continued sporadically until the turn of the century.
The Swadeshi (Nationalistic) movement lent an impetus to the
insurance business.

More and more companies were organized

and business increased to great proportions.

It was felt that

this growing sector should be organized and regulated under a
separate act.

Also there was the demand that some kind of

protection be afforded to the policy holder.

All these factors

necessitated the passing of the first Indian Insurance Act in
1912.

The first World War also increased the total business

of the companies.

The lure of profitable and expanding busi¬

ness brought in its wake many discrepancies and abuses.

In
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the scramble for business the expense ratio mounted.

The

system of giving rebates on commissions, already exorbitantly
high, forced many companies to work on very low margins and led
many into speculative activities and dangerous ventures.

The

Depression wiped out the weak companies and forced others that
did not have sufficient financial resources to close up.
Speculative and unwise investments brought a speedy end to
the activities of many other companies.

These reasons have

been a contributory factor in the formation of an informal
convention among the insurance companies to seek non-speculative securities for their investment.
p^fl^cts this attitude.

The data in Table V.l

At the end of the second World War,

the non-corporate investment ranks as high as 84.9$, out of
which 68.% is accounted for by the Government securities.
However, the excess in profits and the new business generated
by war conditions sought new outlets where higher returns
seemed probable.

This is reflected in the increase in invest¬

ment in corporate issues from 6.3# in 1939 to 9.4# in 1944
to reach 12.2# in 1948.

A further spurt was received in the

Korean war boom and the ratio stood in 1954 at 16.3#—an alltime high for the insurance companies.

The variation then

over the 17-year period stands at 9.0.

As Table V.2 indicates

this is entirely at the expense of the Government and semiGovernment securities.
The year 1956 is of importance for the Indian Life
Insurance business.

The business was nationalized that year

and the assets transferred to the newly-created Life Insurance
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TABLE V.l
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL ASSETS OF
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES
1939 - 1958

TYPE OF INVESTMENT
GOVERNMENTS:
1.
Central & State
Government securities • • •
2. Government approved security
3.
Foreign Govt,
securities • •
LAND & HOUSE PROPERTY

1939

1944

194-8

1950

1955

1956

1958

59.5

62.3

55.4

51.6

45.3

49.4

50.7

8.1

5.5

5.2

4.8

5.7

7.3

7.3

1.1
6.8

0.7
4.6

1.5

3.4

1.7
4,2

2.0
4.7

3-2
4.7

1.?
4.4

MORTGAGES ON PROPERTY

2.9

l.l

2.3

2.4

4.1

3.6

2.5

LOANS ON POLICIES

9.1

5.9

5.3

6.1

8.2

8.9

7.9

MISCELLANEOUS ....

6.7

5.7

15.9

14.0

2.5

9.6

19.5

93.2

90.6

87.8

85.4

83.9

86.1

84.9

6.8

9.4

12.2

14.6

16.1

13.9

15.1

TOTAL NON CORPORATE
INVESTMENT. . .

CORPORATE INVESTMENT

Source: S.R.K. Rao, "The Indian Honey Market”
Chaitanya Publishing House, Allahabad, 1959* P. 21.
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TABLE V.2
VARIATION IK INVESTMENT OF INSURANCE COMPANIES AS A
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ASSETS

INVESTMENT CATEGORY

1938

19 55*

VARIATION

62.6

53.0

- 9.6

LOANS

9.2

8.2

- 1.0

LAND AND BUILDINGS

6.3

4.7

- 1.6

SHARES AND DEBENTURES

7.1

16.1

♦ 9.0

MORTGAGES

3.2

^.1

♦ 0.9

GOVERNMENT SECURITIES

Source: A, N,. Agarwala, M Insurance in
Allahabad Lav Journal Press, Allahabad, I960.

India".

TABLE V.3
POLICIES OUTSTANDING AND INVESTMENTS OF L.I .C.

New policies issued

195?

1956

1957

1958

I960

1961

240.5

187.7

277.7

339.1

498.0

609.0

Policies Outstanding 1128.0

N.A.

137“+.0 1584.0 2285.0 2737.0

Premium Income

58.3

37.6

88.1

73.1

97.0

112.3

Corporate Investment

16.1

13.9

14.9

15.1

21.3

22.1

Sourcet Indian Insurance Yearbooks, Bombay, L I C
Annual Reports, Bombay,
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Corporation of India (LIC).

Inasmuch as the LIC was created

to do away with malpractices, it was expected that the atten¬
tion of the officers of the Corporation would now be focused
on internal structure, expansion of business and the liquida¬
tion of investments that became undesirable burdens.
reflected in Table V.3.

This is

While the figures for the Hew Policies

Issued show a continuous rise after the dip in 1956 (attrib¬
utable perhaps to the initial adjustment difficulties of the
newly-created Corporation) the investment in corporate
securities shows a lover ratio at 13.9# and 14.9#.

3y the year

1961 the LIC had more than doubled Its total Policies Out¬
standing and appropriately enough its advances to the Private
3ector, including Banking, Trade and Commerce rose to 22.1#.
A comparative study of the Life Insurance invest¬
ments in industry Is seen in Table V.4.

The change in in¬

vestments in different sectors over the fifteen years in four
countries is seen.

In the TJ.S., the industries almost doubled

their share from 24.7# to 43.7#.

In the U.K., the industries

show a similar rise from 27.0# to 40.0#.

In a sharp contrast

to this the share of Indian industries has increased from 9.4#
to 14.8# only.

Viewed against the background of a capital

market that does net feature debentures as prominently as in
the U.S., the percentage reveals its inadequacy.
Disappointing as these figures are, it has to be
understood that the policy of investment is governed by law
and rules.

Thus the LIC cannot invest in Government and Semi-

Government securities less than 50# of its available funds and

91

TABLE V.4
DISTRIBUTION OF LIFE INSURANCE INVESTMENTS AS A
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ASSETS

Country

Govern¬
ment &
semiGovernment

Indus¬ Mort¬
try
gages

Loans
on
pol¬
icies

Govern-\ Indus- Mort- \ Loans
ment &
try
gages on
semipol¬
Governicies
ment
1.5

7.0

9.6

43.7 34.9

4.4

26.7

4o.O 14.9

1.3

India

69.7

9.4

1.0

4.8

60.7

TJ.S.A.

50.3

24.7

14.8

4.4

U.K.

50.1

27.0

6.6

1.2

Japan

40.2

16.5

-

Source:
January 27, 1962.

2.1

Journal "Commerce*" Bombay.

14.8

21.7
Issue of

-

49.6

92
in non-corporate investments not less than 15$, leaving only
35$ of the total investment available for corporate invest¬
ment.

This 35$ has to be invested in the ordinary stock of

only those companies that have paid dividends of not less
than b% on the face value for seven out of nine preceding
years.

It could be invested in preference shares of com¬

panies or debentures of only such companies that have paid
dividends on their ordinary shares for five out of seven
preceding years.

Even this investment cannot exceed 2i$

of the total or 10$ of the share and debenture liability
of these companies.

With all these restrictions, the profit¬

ability of such an investment from the point of view of
dividend payments is not satisfactory.

As is seen in Table

A.l in Armendix 1, Indian companies do not pay very regular¬
ly any dividends.

This would go a long way in discouraging

any thoughts of substantial investment.

With these great

odds in mind it should not be difficult to see how or why
the insurance participation in financing industries is so
low.
Investment Trusts;
The idea of an investment trust which has for its
purpose diversified investment in different industrial
securities while drawing its support from different sources,
is almost non-existent.

The reasons for this underdevelop¬

ment are not difficult to understand.

The idea itself has not

been understood very widely and as such the individual investor
prefers to hold the securities himself rather than entrust his
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savings to a company which might make unwise decisions and
end up with unsound investments.

Also the preference of the

individual investor in India is for such securities which will
get him a rapid capital appreciation, rather than a steady
dividend return—a principle upon which a prudent investment
trust would not lean very heavily.
This does not mean, however, that there are no invest¬
ment trusts in India.

In 1957* 619 investment trust companies

reported operating on a paid up capital of Hs. 370 million.
However, only nine companies had a capital outlay exceeding
Hs. 5 million each.

Fifty percent of the remaining 610 were

operating on a capital outlay of less than Hs. 100,000.00.
The reason for this unusually high number of operating
investment trusts may be found in the following two quota¬
tions:
There is at present a fairly large number of companies
which are registered as investment and trust companies
(separate data for Investment trusts only not being
available) but the vast majority of them do not perform
the functions of a true investment trust. Most of them
are connected with the management of funds of a few rich
individuals and families or of managing agents for
investment In companies controlled by them, and are in
the nature of holding companies rather than public
trusts.
. let it be noted however, that the majority
of investment trust companies operating in this country
are of a closed end type and are primarily engaged
either in administering the funds of wealthy interests
or are connected with managing agency houses. These
managing agency houses have formed these investment
companies with the avowed object of keeping control
over the companies under their management.
This process
has permitted them considerable in-corporate investment
under the administration of one single agent.^
Table V.5 lists the important investment trusts showing the
extent of their investments, with their group affiliations in
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TABLE V.5
INVESTMENT TRTJSTS IN INDIA

NAME

PAID UP
CAPITAL

Birds Investments Ltd.

INVESTMENTS

GROUP
AFFILIATION

4,400,000

6,517,559

425,000

547,401

Eastern Investments Ltdi.

7,626,000

16,231,176

Lord Cable

Industrial Investment
Trust Limited

9,999,250

12,685,964

Premchand

900,000

1,526,970

Bird

J. K. Investment Trust Ltd.7,257,700

2,650,093

Singhania

New India Investment
Corporation Ltd.

2,332,100

3,629,480

Birla

Calcutta Investment Ltdi.

5,500,000

5,280,053

Goenka

13,880,000

20,594,990

Andrew Yule

N.K.

35,200,000

Tata

General Investment &
Trust Co. Ltd.

Investment and Finance
Company Limited

Clive Row Investment
Holding Co. Ltd.
Investment Corporation
of India

Bird
M

Source:
S. K. Sur: Stock Exchange and New Issue Market
Indian Institute of Social Studies, Calcutta, 1961.
pp. w.
TABLE V.6
RESERVES OF INVESTMENT TRUSTS

NAME

PAID UP
CAPITAL

Bird*s Investment Ltd.
Eastern Investments Ltd.
Industrial Investment
Trust Ltd.
New India Investment
Corporation Ltd.
Source:

RESERVES

4,400,000
7,626,000

779,721
5,717,047

9,999,250

2,021,794

2,332,100

777,391

Ibid., Pp. 50.
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parentheses.
The investment trusts as seen in Table V.? in all
except two cases, have investments exceeding their paid up
capital.

The additional resources came from the undistributed

profits which have been accumulating and have been reinvested
over many years.

The profits thus earned are transferred to

reserves, which accumulate in time to form a sizable bloc,
as can be seen in Table V.6.

The advantage of share value

appreciation are also not distributed, nor are the special
reserves arising out of premiums charged at the issue of
shares.

Their investments range over a wide area.

However,

the fact that most of these have group affiliations, makes
the distribution of any profits and/or bonus reserves almost
a family affair.

This could be considered the reason the

investment trusts have not been able to popularize themselves.
The Underwriters:
The underwriting operations in IncUa are of interest,
if only because of their elusive nature.

Beneficial by nature

in all respects, the first attempt at underwriting is recorded
in 1912, when the Stock Broker*s firm of Messrs. Batlivala and
Karani underwrote the shares of the Central India Spinning and
Weaving Company Limited.

In 1913 Mr. Chunilal Saraiya under¬

wrote the entire Preference share issue of Messrs. Tata Mills
Limited.

The underwriting activity lagged during the Twenties,

however, in the late thirties a total of nine issues was under¬
written.
Prominent among these were:

Hindustan Bicycle Mfg. Co.
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Ltd, and Industrial Corporation Limited by their managing agents
Industrial Syndicate; Steel Corporation of Bengal by the Indian
Iron and Steel Company Limited and Burn & Company; Raza Textiles
Limited by the Investment Corporation of India Limited; Western
India Match Company Limited by the Investment Corporation Ltd,
and the Central Bank of India; Textile Machinery Corporation
Ltd, by Hindustan Investments Limited; Devkaran Nanjee Invest¬
ment Corporation Ltd, by Devkaran Nanjee Banking Corporation
Ltd,

Among these the Hindustan Bicycles, Industrial Corpora¬

tion and Textile Machinery Corporation underwritings could be
attributed to the House of Birlas,

Those of Raza Textiles and

Western India could be attributed to the House of Tatas.

The

Steel Corporation of Bengal was later merged into one of its
underwriters and the managing agency of the resulting giant
firm was taken over by Martin Burn, Limited, a firm into which
the other underwriter of Steel Corporation of Bengal, the
Burn & Company was merged.
In 1946 underwriting activity was again on the upgrade
with 30 issues totaling Rs, 165 million underwritten.

This

formed just over 41,9# of the total issue on the market, leaving
about 58.1# of the total issue to be floated without any under¬
writing assistance.

The important feature of the 1946 under¬

writing activity was the participation by the stock broking
firms on a large scale and the underwriting assistance given
by firms engaged in manufacturing or trading activity.

Thus

the Dalmia Cement and Paper Marketing Company Limited under¬
wrote the issue of Dalmia Jain Airways Limited.
cidentally, belong to House of Dalmia-Jain.

Both, in¬

Investment Trusts
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were active too.

Investment Corporation of India Ltd, under¬

wrote the issue of the National Rayon Corporation Ltd.; both
belonging to the House of Tatas.
Underwriting was resorted to on a large scale in the
second half of the fifties.

From the total issue of Rs. 40

million in 1956, this amount increased to Hs. 233 million in
I960.

Out of this total amount, issues worth Rs. 21.1 million

were underwritten as compared to 142.3 million in i960.
Participation by the banks and stock broking firms in this
was of significant importance.

More important was the bold

leadership given by the agencies of Government of India:
The Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC), the Industrial
Finance Corporation (IFC), the State Bank of India (SBI), and,
most Important of all, the Industrial Credit and Investment
Corporation of India (ICICI).

Over the period of five years,

1956 to I960 stockbrokers underwrote 25$ of the total amount
underwritten, banks underwrote 25% and the ICICI and LIC to¬
gether underwrote about 29$•

The lead taken by these two

agencies can be appreciated more when it is kept in mind that
ICICI and LIC came into existence in 1955 and 1956.
Many reasons could be advanced for the reluctant support
industry has received in underwriting.

In the first place the

underwriter by the terms of his contract is obliged to take up
those shares that are not subscribed by the public.

The ex¬

perience of the "boom” years between 1955-60 has been that on
an average lb% of the underwritten issue had to be taken up by
the Underwriters and had to be covered by the guarantee, this

percentage reaching its peak at 34g in 1956.

Secondly, the

underwriting in the non-government sector was never undertaken
and implemented on any scientific well-tested principle.

There

was no attempt at a proper study of the market behavior.

No

survey is taken of investment climate.

There is no systematic

study of market operation and technique of issue placement.
Underwriting has been undertaken by more than one
individual underwriters, like Mr. Saraiya
There are the stock brokers* firms, the banks, the insurance
companies, the investment trusts, manufacturing firms and
trading firms.

All are engaged in the underwriting activity.

However, none of these agencies are equipped, experienced
or for that matter interested in underwriting operations that
will rival the effort, study and experience that backs up a
similar U.S. firm.

The firms that did participate in these

activities looked upon it as a type of a secondary or by-way
operation and tried to be as selective as possible.

This

resulted in their choice of only such issues that did not
actually need any underwriting.

The Herd-instincts of the

underwriters and the ever-repeating inbreeding that occurs
were also the factors influencing the choice of particular
issue for underwriting.

It is difficult to justify the under¬

writing activity undertaken by a company that is primarily
engaged in manufacturing activity because of group-oriented
attitudes.

Underwriting has always had periodic surges of

activity.
The lack of continuity in this respect is mainly
due to the non-existence of issuing houses, investment
banks and underwriting firms in this country.
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Thus the underwriting took place only when any intra-group
issues were floated or when the market conditions foretold
a boom period.

The underwriting of the Devkaran Nanjee Invest¬

ment Corporation Limited by the Devkaran Nanjee Banking Cor¬
poration Limited would be an example of intra-group under¬
writing.

(A comparable situation would arise in the U.S.

if the Christiana Corporation were to underwrite the issue
of E. I. duPont.)

The insistence of underwriters to expand

their activities in the boom periods led an analyst to remark:
.... it may be suspected that part of the
underwriting has come from those who were influenced
wholly by the fact that the issues they had under¬
written would have a 100$ chance of success. These
underwriters inay be called fair weather friends.
It may, therefore, be posed whether the present
activity of the underwriters would continue if the
capital market takes an unfavourable turn..

The Stock Exchanges and the New Issue Market:
The development of stock exchanges in India has been
the result of purely private endeavor.

The foremost Stock

Exchange began in Bombay as a private association of neople
interested in dealing in stocks and bonds.

Indeed, even to

this day, it has retained its name as the Native and Stock
Brokers Association.

It is not registered as a corporate

body, but has a recognition from the Government of India.
>

The Companies Act of 1913 permitted organization of Stock
Exchanges on a corporate basis and advantage of this was
taken to open Stock Exchanges in different places like
Calcutta, Madras and Delhi.

Until the enactment of the

Securities Contract (Regulation) Act of 19?6, the control of
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all the activities was in the hands of the Stock Exchange
authorities themselves.

This was reflected for example, in

the provisions governing the memberships and new applications.
In Bombay the membership is open only to the natives of India
or the British subjects who have resided in the State of Bombay
for at least five years prior to the application.

In Calcutta

a candidate has to pay an entrance fee of Rs. 5000.00; but if
he is applying for the membership of a deceased member of his
joint Hindu family, this fee is reduced to Rs. 500.00.

In

Madras, a nomination can be made by an existing member only
in favor of the son, godson, nephew or brother of the retiring
member.

If a member dies without a nomination the legal heir

can make a nomination.
A member of a stock exchange in India acts in a dual
capacity of a jobber and broker.

No distinction is observed

between the two as is observed in the London Stock Exchange.
The members can employ remisiers or sub-brokers, who act as
touts in securing business.
The frequency of buying and selling transactions on
a stock exchange determine the marketability of a share.

In

India the system is geared to the maximum flow of securities
from one party to another.

Such transactions as are carried

out on behalf of genuine buyers interested in Investment for
income rather than capital gains, are carefully distinguished
from the speculative activities.

The rules regulating these

transactions are not very different from those found on the
London or New York Exchanges.

Thus the Securities Contract

(Regulation) Act made it mandatory for every Stock Exchange
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to obtain a certificate of registration from the Government
of India,

Like the SEC in the U.S., the Government of India

has secured powers to supervise the activities of various stock
exchanges as well as the individual brokers and, circumstances
demanding, can require the erring Stock Exchange or the Ex¬
change member to refrain from any activity.

In the same

way, the Government of India can have the trading margin
lowered or increased, in case of highly sensitive or highly
speculative stocks, as the circumstances demand.
Two types of transactions are peculiar to Indian stock
exchange.

These are the system of Badla and of Blank Transfer.

there are facilities for carrying over a tran¬
saction from one settlement to another settlement; this,
in the Indian market parlance, is known as a budla
transaction.
It is essential to note that carry-over
is not compulsory; in fact that would be a wager con¬
tract and Invalid.
The carry-over is effected by
squaring up the transaction for the current settle¬
ment and simultaneously entering into a new tran¬
saction for the next settlement. Thus, a person
who has bought 10 shares of Tata Steel, which is
a 'forward1 scrip, has three choices before him.
He may take delivery for the current settlement or
sell them before settlement and thus square up his
position or carry-over the purchase to the next
settlement.
The carry-over is done through sep¬
arate but simultaneous transactions, namely, sale
for the current settlement and purchase for the
next settlement. The operator has to pay a price for
the facility of carrying over the transaction, which
in effect amounts to borrowing money.
The carry-over
charge or the budla rate is normally determined by
the prevailing short-term rate of interest, besides
including a small insurance premium. Thus, if the
price of the share is Rs. 150, the interest rate 6
per cent and the period of the next settlement 15
days, the budla, on the basis of pure interest, is
38 nP.
If the carry-over is large, the budla could
even be at 50 nP. This means that if the share is
sold for the current account for Rs. 150, it is
simultaneously bought back for the next settlement
at Rs. 150.50.
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The person who is carrying over a sale transaction
is in effect loaning money and so he receives a
payment, that is, the difference between the purchase
and sale price (i.e. the JO nP. in the above example).
Also, the budla transaction is in effect advancing
money without margin; partly for this reason the return
on a budla transaction is slightly higher than the
usual short-term rate of interest, i.e. it includes
a risk premium,^
Blank Transfers
imply shares registered in the name of parties
unknown to the holder and transfer deeds signed by
those parties as sellers, but are blank as regards
the buyers name.,The advantage here is that
a possible squeeze in any scrip is prevented, as
some shares continue to circulate in this blank form
and serve as stock in trade. This practice is
prevalent because it allows an easy Budla or a
carry over. Another advantage is that through such
a transfer the high burden of Government Stamp duty
(varying from 0.75 to 1.5$) and transfer charges
levied by the companies are avoided.^
The function of evaluation of securities through
which the Stock Exchange eerves, directs the flow of
the community's savings into the most productive
forms of enterprise.
Secondly the stock exchange
ensures the liquidity of capital. By liquidity it
is meant here the speed with which a capital asset
is converted into a cash asset.^
But from the point of view of a businessman, the Stock Ex¬
change is not a source of constant financing.

A change in

the price of his share, high or low, neither soothes nor
deepens his need.
latent.

His interest in the stock market is rather

It is aroused at the time of issue of securities

he is interested in floating, be they bonds, preference
shares or ordinary, be it a new l^sue or a rights offer.
How the Stock Market reacts, with what ease the investors
accept his offer, influences his financial decision.

The
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new issue market would thus emerge as more important and in¬
fluential than the regular stock exchange.
Indian stock exchanges have one additional advantage
from the point of view of industries.

Indian stock exchanges

function as primary markets of issues.

An individual firm

can have two types of transactions in this respect.

If the

company is already listed on the stock exchange, that is to
say, if the new issue is a

lights issue or a Further issue,

this issue can be directly placed on the market for sub¬
scription.

If the company has not had any listings before

then there are certain regulations which the issuing company
has to follow.
the investor.

These regulations are designed to protect
The issuing company has to furnish with regard

to its various transactions, the reasons for making this
issue, its record of profit distribution etc.

It also has

to oledge a certain portion exclusively for the stock ex¬
change.

This way the stock exchange can function as a

primary issue market.
0

In the Indian Capital Market, there are essentially
four methods of raising capitals

the Prospectus method, the

Offer for Sale method, the 3tock Exchange Placement method
and the Rights Issue method.
(a) Prospectus is a document
which discloses under legal penalty some specific
information for the protection of investors.g
A prospectus has to be filed with the Registrar of Companies
and advertised In major newspapers.

When these formalities

have been completed the company may approach the public for

subscription.

Those companies that are not interested in offer¬

ing the issue to the general public, but wish to place the
issue with private parties and interests, must also file a
Statement in lieu of Prospectus with the Registrar.
(b) Under the Offer for Sale method a private party
or a consortium of private parties acquires a bloc of the
issue and later offers it to the public at a fixed price.
This method is perhaps more beneficial to the company, for
it frees the company from the market fluctuations at any time.
(c) According to the Stock Exchange Placement method,
a company would place the share issue privately with the
brokers and then on the strength of this placement secure
a listing on the Exchange.

The chief disadvantage of this

method is that the brokers are in a position to create an
artificial scarcity in that particular share and play the
market to their own advantage.

Though prevalent in the London

Issue market, this method is being progressively discontinued
in the Indian markets.
(d) Offer to Shareholders is made when an existing
company wishes to issue further capital.

Indeed under Section

81 of the Indian Companies Act, this is compulsory unless the
Shareholders have waived their rights in a General Meeting.
Whichever be the method employed, a consent of the
Government of India has to be obtained for any issue.

Em¬

powered under the Capital Issues (Control) Act, the Govern¬
ment of India can refuse any company a permit to issue and
offer any security.

The term security has been defined to

mean (1) shares, stocks and bonds; (2) debentures; (3) mortgage

10?
deeds, instruments of pawn, pledge or hypothecation and any
other instruments creating a charge or lien on the assets of
the company; (4) instruments acknowledging indebtedness of the
company.

The Government can refuse permission for an issue

on various grounds, such as the capital issue not being neces¬
sary for the immediate future; because the company has enough
capital but has locked it up in undesirable investments; be¬
cause the proposed issue may cause an imbalance in the
capital structure of the company (as between Equity and
fixed interest bearing capital); because .the financial position
of the company is unsatisfactory; or because the enterprise
is speculative.
In this fashion the Government of India has tried to
*

control the issue market in the country and protect the
unwary investor from being caught in some unsound investment.
f

Kowever beneficial these provisions may sound from the point
of view of the individual investor, these present a con¬
tinuous hazard for the Issuer of any new securities.

As can

be seen from the different provisions, any bid for new
securities may be barred on grounds which would not
under the jurisdiction of the Government.

come

All the decisions

involved in such a decision would be considered in western
countries, especially the U.S., as purely executive decisions.
Yet in India this freedom is not given to the corporations.
This has the effect of curbing any free floatations and
indirectly affect the investing atmosphere in the country.
Except for such precautionary provisions, the New
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Issue Market and the Stock Exchanges could be considered well
organized and would stand comparison with those abroad.

Actual

performance, however, has shown this situation to be sharply
different.
Table V.7 lists the issue financed over the five year
period.

Two findings require attention.

issue do not show any gradual progression.
bursts of a sort are noticed.

The figures for total
Rather, periodic

Secondly, the figures for

Further issue exceed beyond normalcy the Initial issues, in
the early years and one may say that on the whole seem to
hold their own well.

Initial issues are made by the new

companies and the Further issues are the bids for additional
finances made by existing firms.

The interpreted figures

would mean therefore that the existing companies are in a
position to cash in on their past performance and stand a
better chance of getting issues through without apparent
difficulty.

This is attested by the fact that Further issues

exceed the Initial issues 2:1 even in the later years.

This

means that the existing companies are placing more issues
than the new companies.

This the existing companies would

not do unless they have an advantage over the Initial issues.
However, not all the issues are brought to the Stock
Exchange.

Table V.7 indicates that a high percentage of issues

is never offered to the public.

Furthermore, the figures

cited in Columns 1 to 4 refer only to issues floated by the
Public Limited companies.

The issues of the private limited

companies are by law not put- on the market and are essentially
taken up through private placements.

Column 5 in Table V.7
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TABLE V.7
CAPITAL ISSUE BROUGHT TO THE MARKET AS COMPARED TO CAPITAL
ISSUE FLOATED PRIVATELY

1957

TOTAL ISSUES FOR PUBLIC LTD.
FIRMS.
Initial Issues ......
Further Issues .
ISSUES BROUGHT TO MARKET . .
3 as a

%

of 1

Sources

1959

I960 (June)

68.05

55.21

70.05

47.35

12.05
56.00

14.95
40.26

26.50
43.55

15.58
31.77

43.15

29.31

26.85

15.25

.

TOTAL ISSUES FLOATED BY
PRIVATE LTD. FIRMS . . . .

1958

63
13.73

38

53
16.43

26.60

32
16.26

Ibid.. Pp. 103-104.

TABLE V.8
SHARES OBTAINED BY DIRECTORS UNDER OFFER FOR SALE

COMPANY

TOTAL NO.
OF SHARES

Martin Burn

OBTAINED
BY DIREC¬
TORS AT
PAR

OFFERED
TO PUBLIC
AT A
LATER DATE

PREMIUM

CHARGED
AS A %

1,300,000

1,299,993

500,000

75.0

Jardine
Hendersons

200,000

199,993

98,000

120.0

Shaw Wallace

650,000

650,000

300,000

80.0

64,900

64,900

22,543

87.5

225,000

225,000

115,000

15.0

Gillanders
Arbuthnot
Rallis India
Sources

Ibid.. Pp. 64.
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indicates that the percentage of issues not subscribed bypublic at large is very high.
The resultant inference here would then be that
though the Stock Exchange has been fairly well developed, the
majority of issues floated do not avail, themselves of the
facilities.

A similar difference between principle and prac¬

tice can also be seen in the Offer for Sale method of issue.
It has already been explained that under such a method a bloc
of shares is offered to a group of private interests,
usually the Directors or the managing agents of the company.
The extent of the influence which such interests have over
such stock placings can be seen in the Table V.8.

It can

be seen that the overwhelming majority of shares has been
taken up by the directors.

Out of the shares taken up by

them, an insignificant amount is offered to the public.
The public, however, is never invited to contribute to the
major portion.
It could be said in conclusion that India at present
possesses an excellent organized medium for the working of a
capital market.

The underwriting facilities available in the

country should lead to more and more reliance on it by the
business community.

Yet in practice, it is the Government

section through the ICICI and the LIC, that affords the dis¬
satisfied entrepreneur, not connected with any group or with¬
out any fraternal affiliations, an opportunity to avail
himself of the underwriting facilities.
of the Investment trusts.

The same is true

It may be asked whether these

trusts are not able to broaden their base and develop on

the lines evident in other countries.

1C9
Indeed, in face of such

a closed end group, one may very validly question the raison
d *etre of these trusts.

The funds for setting up these trusts

come from the same source as the funds for the companies in
which they hold their shares.

Since the investment trusts*

idea originated in India before the Government of India
assumed some powers to prevent any concentration of shareownership, one cannot plead that the investment trusts were
operated to escape any anti-trust laws.

The only explanation

available is that these trusts could have originated to
escape the steep income taxes that would have to be paid
unless some other holding company was created.

Whatever

be the motive behind a trust, its ends are the same.

The

non-affiliated businessman cannot hone to get any substantial
help from them.
Similar is the case with the New Issue market.

Indeed

it is easier to place an issue privately for then it saves
the expenses of floatation which sometimes may run as high
as 10# of the total issue.
In summary, it can be said that though in India the
medium exists, advantage is taken of organized media and
utilized to own ends by private interests.

CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
Any Industrial enterprise is in need of two types
of resources:

investment capital and working capital.

Investment would be obtained primarily by issuing shares
or both.

It can also be obtained by floating a loan

issue possibly convertible at a later date into capital
stock.

Mortgage loan may also be used by pledging the

assets of the company at a fairly long term of 7, 10 or
1? years.

The company may obtain such long-term loans

by executing notes in favor of the lender, creating in
this manner a charge on the assets.
be obtained by loans and advances.

Working capital may
Since the term work¬

ing capital is understood here to mean the total of current
assets, it is possible that a part of the working capital,
the inventory, is financed through fairly long term loans.
It is more commonly obtained through the banks.

Such

loans are also obtained through individual lenders.

In¬

dustrial entrepreneurs in India avail themselves of all
these sources.

In the previous chapters informatory data

have been presented.

The objective of this chapter is to

evaluate such data and to determine the weight of its con¬
tentions in the light of the problem posed.
It was noticed that the organizational pattern of
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capital financing is being increasingly westernized.

Govern¬

mental efforts in this direction have been prominent.

For

the businessmen, the western pattern conferred a legal entity
on their enterprises and at the same time provided tax ben¬
efits.

It also made it possible for these businessmen to

use these western patterns to wield a tight control over the
financing of their enterprises.

In this can be said that

the operation of the western systems has remained typically
Indian.
It was seen in Chapter Two that internal sources, comorised of depreciation and reserves, contributed a high per¬
centage of finances.

It was observed that depreciation pro¬

visions compared favorably with those in other western
countries, but it was also noticed that funds, earmarked for
replacement, were utilized mainly for purposes other than
replacement.

Reserves were also created forming the other

major internal source.

The creation of reserves is in keep¬

ing with the western system, but the method of creating these
reserves differs.

In the first place, the unusual plurality

of stock holding, shown in Table II.5, facilitated the tight
control on the policy of the organization.

With this control

the company could restrict any grant of dividends, (See Table
A.l in Appendix) for a long time and thus have a bigger share
available.

Also the nature of shareholding permitted a greater

re-investment of profits distributed.

In this, it can be said

that the operational method is Indian.
Such a reliance on internal financing is necessitated
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by the refusal of commercial banks to provide any long term
investment capital.

In spite of the fact that the Banking

Companies Act of 19^9, did not prohibit investment in shares
or debentures, it was found that, (1) the organized sector
of banking business is not interested in either subscribing
\

to the share capital of Indian companies, nor is it interested
in advancing any long term loans.

(2) Its chief contribution

to corporate financing is in furnishing short-term, selfliquidating loans made available through discounting of bills
and made against hypothecation, inventory, an item which is
not a permanent asset, figuring as the most prominent security.
4

While any long term advance was thus ruled out, it made
hypothecation a mere formality allowing for a free play
through such personal or group influences.

(3) Even the

advances that the banks did make, were not necessarily growth
oriented.

They were made without any such guiding principle.

Two conclusions can be drawn from these findings.
(1) Absence of long term investment financing from the banks
forced the companies to rely more on their internal sources.
(2) An entrepreneur who did not have the combined resources
of a group-oriented control could not hope to survive in
the absence of such help from banking business.

In turn this

absence indirectly precipitated such control.
How the advantage of such a situation was taken is
evident from the study of managing agency system.

It is seen

how the enterprises under the control of the managing agents
are financed by them.

Their function is manifold.

Besides

standing security to the bank loans and advances, they also
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make loans available from Individuals on the strength of
their own standing.

Their individual loans to the companies

are also considerable.

Their position in the field of

corporate financing and the fact that managing agencies are
all personalized and family-oriented organizations emphasize
the fact that Indian corporate enterprise derives much from
personalized methods of financing.
The situation was found to be discouraging with regard
to availability of investment capital from the organized sector.
The contribution of the insurance companies was not at all
satisfactory.

In spite of the huge resources available to

them, their role in corporate sector was subordinate to
their activities in other sectors, such as governmental and
gilt-edged markets.

They were attracted to these markets

primarily because of the non-soeculative nature of these
securities.

Indeed till the formation of the LIC, this

contribution to the corporate sector remained at a stationary
level while their resources showed such a high increase.
After the formation of the LIC this participation shows in¬
crease.

However, this increase must be discounted for one

reason.

It may be recalled that the insurance companies,

are restricted, by statute, to investing in shares and de¬
bentures of such companies, as have shown a creditable record
of dividend distribution.

This means that past performance of

an existing company is a major consideration.

In other words

the investment policy is not growth oriented.

Thus the

statutory limitation results in supporting established firms

114which are controlled by various groups and interests and
denying such support to newer industries.
That the underwriting activity in India has not shown
any sustained progress, but rather has been characterized by
sporadic growth was seen from the discussion.

From the nature

of their activity it can be discerned that the underwriting
itself is not very useful to the expanding issue market.

On

the contrary it is the underwriters that benefit from the
issue.

Their underwriting activity is limited to issues that

are backed by group interests and are thus bound to succeed
on the virtue of intrinsic prestige.

That the issues did not

depend on underwriting for its success, but could find a ready
market is evident from the fact that in 19?6 4*7.5# of the
total Issue was floated without any underwriting assistance.
To consider investment trusts to be on par with
similar institutions in either the TJ.S. or the U.K., would
be misrepresentation.

Their closed end organization and

close connection with the group Interests makes it difficult
for them to play the role that similar organizations play
in western countries.

Whatever the object they were started

with, they become the dumping ground for shares of their
associated companies.
Close examination of the stoclj; exchange activity
leads to two conclusions.

(1) As a media of channeling

capital resources It is not a very effective source as a
major portion of the total stock offered in a year is not
placed on the exchange for issue at all.

(2) The fact that
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among the issues successful at the exchange, the Further
Issues, which have the backing of their past performance
and group affiliations, are dominant, shows that newer
companies do not benefit from the stock exchange.

Thus

the organized sector does not offer any encouragement to
the new enterprises that do not have the backing of any
group.
Such groups, however, are overwhelmingly familyoriented.

Personalized identification with such groups and

the family affiliations thereof have been mentioned in
Chapter One.

These could be reiterated.

Under this class¬

ification would fall the role of the families of Goenkas,
Bangurs and Kanorias play in firms like Shaw Wallace,
Octavius Steel, Kettlewell Bullen and Anderson Wright.
Similar position in the pharmaceutical Industry in Western
India has been achieved by the leading families of Kasturbhai Lalbhai and Sarabhais.

So is the family of

Mr. Mutthiah Chettiar active in the Madura Mills.

How¬

ever an enumeration of the number of units owned by a
business house in each of the several industries does not
convey an idea of the real extent of its part in the in¬
dustry or its importance.

Simply to say that the Kanpur

house of Juggilal Kamlapat own one aluminum plant is to do
injustice to the house.

For the aluminum unit owned by

them is one of the only two units in the country.

A similar

position has been attained by the House of Tatas, which
manages the Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited, the largest
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single producer of Iron and Steel in the entire country.
Such Interests wield influence over a vast industrial
field.

Through the operation of the managing agency system

and multiple interlocking directorships, these interests are
able to retain their control and affect the working of the
industrial enterprise.
The powers they have and the effects of such a power
concentration have to be measured negatively.

That these

groups have participated heavily in the industrial develop¬
ment of the country, can be seen from the figures of total
issue which their companies floated.

The focus of attention

here is double, as explained in the introductory chapter.
Given the resources of India and the internal market potential,
it can be argued that the group initiated development has
been a liability to Indian economic growth.

As late as

19531 this development was restricted to a few fields and
not until the promulgation of different five year plans did
this development acquire a sense of direction and purpose.
What then, it may be posed guided the group in their activities.
It is impossible here to speak in terms of a "mission to
fulfill."

There was no sense of obligation behind their

activity.

There were no principles of business philosophy.

To this date, no reliable market surveys are available.

The

consumption figures, which the government puts out, are
estimates and conjectures.

It is difficult to imagine how

an industrial organization could be set up and run, without
the significant factual data that influence its purchasing,
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manufacturing and sales policies.

The explanation for the

industrial aggrandizement that these groups possess has to
be sought in non-economic areas.
Could the acquisitive philosophy of the groups ensure
the "ate of growth needed by India.

Though these groups had

the resources to support any bold, brave olan they wished to
undertake, no such plan materialized.

In the vacuum thus

created government, through its various agencies, has been
assuming a greater role.

But the desirability of such a

role can be anproprlately questioned.

The increasingly active

participation of governmental agencies in effect acknowledges
the Impossibility of improving upon the existing framework
of industrial financing institutions.
Improvement can be effected in two ways, by importing
new techniques or by changing the established methods.

It

was implicitly suggested, while discussing the role of banks
in Germany, that the Ind4an banks also adopt such methods.
t

Such an adoption would merely involve onening of additional
departments to assist the existing ones and to that extent
would coordinate the existing efforts.

A phased program

to provide such services would not have to necessitate a
large dose of abrupt change and thus the transition would
be easier.
Besides, banking,there are nossibilities of improve¬
ment in other fields too.

Reorganization of investment trusts

could be cited as a primary need.

Public participation,

liberal dividend policies would attract favorable public

I
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support.

A higher rate of interest for debentures would

allow them to compete with governmental bonds and attract
the large segment of non-speculative investment capital
seeking higher earnings.

A change in concept of shares,

from the present face value procedure to par value procedure
would be desirable.

The investment trusts, the banks and

insurance companies could very profitably explore the
possibility of establishing a consortium which will engage
itself exclusively in long term loans, of not less than 7-10
year duration, extending up to a maximum of 15 years.

This

would free the excessive burden placed now on the internal
t

finances and would permit a healthier dividend policy on
part of the companies.
It is not very difficult to suggest possible avenues
-

|

'

<1

,

V *

of improvement, but the difficulty lies in implementing them#
The present situation presents obstacles which will have to
be surmounted by purely internal reorganization or face the
increasing governmental participation.

India has the

organization for industrial financing but she lac.^s the
principles of operation.
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APPENDIX A

TABLE A.l
DIVIDEND DISTRIBUTION BY INDIAN COMPANIES

Industry
Group

Total number of
companies con¬
sidered In each
group

Number of Companies
paying consistent
dividend
10 years
5 years

Coal

63

21

5

Cotton Textile

21

5

3

Jute

58

11

9

Cement

10

6

-

Electric Equipment

21

15

4

Engineering

30

12

7

Paper

12

6

2

Sugar

33

10

9

Tea

138

27

^3

Miscellaneous

107

Insurance
Total

9
571

15
....

3

2

213

109

Source: S . K. Sur. Stock Exchange and New Issue
Markett Calcutta* 1961, Pp. TJT?r
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